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"The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious. 
It is the fundamental emotion which stands at the cradle of true 
art and true science. 
Whoever does not know it and can no longer wonder, no longer 
I 
marvel, is as good as dead, and his eyes are dimmed. " 










Terms of Reference 
This project was commissioned by Mr A C Britten of Eskom TSI and supervised by 
Prof. C T Gaunt of the University of Cape Town. The final instructions given on 1 
February 1999, were: 
1. To undertake a thorough literature search on the mechanism of Geomagnetically 
Induced Currents and its effect on power network equipment. 
2. Review prevailing solar activity and identify the potential benefits of monitoring 
GICs and its effects. 
3. Investigate correlation (if any) between previous system events and geomagnetic 
storms. 
4. Understand the modelling process necessary to theoretically predict expected levels 
ofGIC in the Eskom MTS. 
Instruction 3 was necessary to establish whether the Eskom MTS might be susceptible to 
GICs. Instruction 4 was done based on a method developed at the Finnish 











This thesis could not have been carried without substantial help from expertise from the 
University of Cape Town, Eskom and the Finnish Meteorological Institute, all whom 
have been mentioned in the acknowledgements. The breakdown of work on various 
aspects of the thesis was as follows: 
Literature Search 
Although the literature review was done by myself I would not be able to do it 
thoroughly without the input and guidance of Prof. C T Gaunt (UCT), Mr A C Britten 
(Eskom, TSI), Prof. R Pirjola (Finnish Meteorological Institute) and Mr C King (Eskom, 
Transmission). 
Investigation of Past Events 
The investigation into possible correlation between system events and GICs would not 
be possible without data received from Dr P Sutcliffe (Hermanus Magnetic Observatory) 
and Mr E Stokes-Waller (Eskom, National Control). Guidance to identify such events 
was provided by Prof. C T Gaunt (UCT). 
Modelling Technique 
The understanding and application of the necessary method to completely model the 
effect of GICs on power networks would not be possible without the support and 
guidance of Prof. R Pirjola and Dr A Viljanen both of the Finnish Meteorological 
Institute. 











This thesis serves to describe the findings of the investigation into the possible existence 
and occurrence of Geomagnetically Induced Currents (GICs) in the Eskom MTS. The 
project commenced in January 1999 and is a joint collaboration between Eskpm, the 
University of Cape Town and EPRI. 
Eskom has been aware since about 1990, that occasional severe geomagnetic storms in 
the Southern Cape might disrupt the MTS in that area. At that time no correlation was 
observed between disruptions at selected sites of the Eskom MTS and geomagnetic 
activity. (The sites selected were based on the knowledge at that time.) However, there 
is now evidence that the sites most susceptible are not at the conventionally accepted 
locations, and that damage and disruption may have occurred where it was not expected. 
For this project a thorough literature search was done to understand the source and 
effects of GICs. An investigation was conducted into the past events on the Eskom 
MTS, which was compared with geomagnetic activity to check for correlation. Finally, 
the modelling process of a network that would indicate its susceptibility to GICs was 
studied. 
Typical disruptions that would indicate the existence of GICs include Buchholz trips, 
interwinding faults, permanent failure due to internal faults, etc. From this investigation 
there is circumstantial evidence that equipment damage may have occurred due to 
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During solar storms, enormous flares of energy on the sun's surface hurl dense waves of 
charged particles through space. These emissions are called Coronal Mass Ejection's 
(CME's) and the flow of plasma, called the solar wind, may reach the earth several days 
later, where it interacts with and disrupts the earth's magnetic field, known as a 
geomagnetic storm. 
It has been known since the early 1940's that large transient fluctuations of the earth's 
magnetic field can produce quasi-de currents in electric power systems through the 
grounded neutral of transformers. These geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) cause 
half-cycle saturation of power transformers resulting in increasing reactive power 
requirements and the generation of harmonics. During intense geomagnetic disturbances 
there have been unusual swings in real and reactive power flow, excessive voltage 
fluctuations, frequency shifts, undesired relay operations, and high harmonic currents [1, 
2,3]. ~ TRANSMISSION LINE 
GIC m EARTH SURFACE 
'----------+-1 I 1------------' 
Figure 1 Induced voltage drives GIC 














The most dramatic recent impact occurred in March 1989 with Solar Cycle 22 when 
virtually the entire Canadian province of Quebec was plunged into darkness. In total 
21500 MW of load and generation was lost and it lasted more than 9 hours to fully 
restore the supply. The same geomagnetic disturbance affected several large power 
transformers elsewhere, and caused hundreds of maloperations of relays and protective 
systems. Power systems suffered voltage depressions and unusual swings in real and 
reactive power flow [1, 3]. 
Power networks are more vulnerable today because of the continual expansion and 
increase in interconnections, thus linking large cumulative earth surface potentials. 
Networks situated above igneous rock geology are most vulnerable since the relatively 
high resistance encourages more current to flow in alternative conductors such as the 
power lines located above these formations. Power systems adjacent to coastal areas are 
also more susceptible to GICs due to the large induced currents in the highly conductive 
seawater. 
The greatest GIC problem occurs at high latitudes in or near the auroral zones. In these 
areas the geomagnetic storms are most intense and frequent since the ionospheric source 
is typically a localised electrojet. The occurrence of these storms statistically follows 
the sunspot cycle (ca. 11 years), so definite and reliable conclusions of GICs require 
recordings and observations of at least this time. Countries at mid-latitude such as South 
Africa are located far from the magnetic pole and therefore do not experience the same 
severity of geomagnetic disturbances as North America or Scandinavia. However, long 
transmission lines, high resistance rock geology and coastal areas could present a risk 
during a very severe storm. This project serves to introduce the phenomenon as part of 
Eskom's preparation for the next solar peak. The solar peak is expected in the first 














Coronal mass ejections are violent discharges of electrically charged gas from the Sun. 
Such an explosion can hurl up to 10 billion tons of gas into space at up to three million 
kilometres per hour [11]. Particles from solar flares disrupt power systems, 
communication technology, space technology etc. The radiation from the flares can 
even give passengers in aeroplanes a dose of radiation equivalent to a medical X-ray 
[12]. 
On March 13, 1989 a severe geomagnetic disturbance occurred affecting various 
technology systems worldwide. This was due to a gigantic solar flare that erupted from 
a large sunspot only three days earlier. Within two days, massive amounts of protons 
and electrons from the blast was captured by the earth's magnetic field, producing 
brilliant auroras and disrupting electric power systems, orbiting satellites and 
communication systems. 
The March 13 geomagnetic storm caused more havoc on U.S. and Canadian power 
systems than any other in history did [4]. Some of these disturbances include the 
blackout of the entire Hydro-Quebec power system, severe damage to large power 
transformers and hundreds of misoperations of relays and protective systems. Power 
systems also suffered voltage fluctuations and unusual swings in real and reactive power 











wel l as t!veryday t'x perience, he fa il ed to convince his princ ipal Sllccessors. Onl} in 
ISIO did i'!' icoi;lus Copernicus (1 473- 1543) began work Oll a surH.:cnlrcd s)stcm and 
\\".:nt far beyond Aristarch us by providing detailed models of the revol ul ion of pl:mels 
around the sun . 
According to his law of centripetal force . Isaac "\iewlon (1642· 1727) estimated the mass 
amI dl;!n sil) of thl;! s un . \\lbile: his initi al estimate of the sun's nlass turned out to be too 
sIllall by an ortler of magnitude. hi s result for the sun's rdative density was withil1 2 
percent of the lIlodern value. By rev ising some of the observlllionaJ panuneters. he later 
made a more accura te estimate of the sun's mass \vhich \\3S witbin 32 percent o f the 
modern value. [n [7Q6 Laplace came within I percent of the \976 accepted V3\ue which 
is 332,946 limes the eat1h's mass. 
l3y 1780. a lkr a cenl ur;. of increasingly sophisticated altem pts to dcterm inc the scale u f 
the solar s) stcm. the ;.tstronoma s had a fa irly reliabk sct of fi gures. In fact, th.: ~olar 
distance of 24,000 earth radi i and solar radius o f 112 ea.rth ra.d ii \ ... en~ ..... ithin 10 jX'rcenl 
of modem values [6]. 
Johannes Fabrici us publi sh.:d the first IXlpcr on "uII."prols in Gerlll<1l1 Y during 161 1 after 
observing il with :I telescope. One year later Gulileo Galilc; (1564-1642) I\TOtc a paper 
on sunspot s arguin g lhat lh e Illation of sunspots proved the SUll rOimed . 
Fig ure 1.1 Galileo used 
observations of the changing 
poSItion of sunspots to prove 











In 1826 Heinrich Schwabe (1 789-1 875) started a daily record of the number of sunspots 
and sunspot groups. As his daw accumulated he observed a cyd ic pattern in the number 
of sunspots. After observing two maxima and Iwo minima of what appeared to be a 10-
y~ar cycle he sent a report of his di swvery to an astronomical joumal . This report \ .. ras 
however passed over by most of his contemporaries. evidently he was 100 fOlT outside the 
astronomical mainstream for his work to receive the altention it deserved . Soon after, 
his observation became significant when it was found that these sunspot variation s were 
identi cal to magnetic variations. J. Rudolf Wolf (1816-93) then reviewed sunspot 
observations since Galileo's day and reported that the cycle' s typical duration was in 
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Figure 1.2 Sunspot numbers through the last four cyele' s [14] . 
Thcse sunspot cycles are very signifLcant since they arc the directly re lated to the 
geomagnet ic di srurbances that induces currents in pipelines <uld cause havoc on power, 












1.2.2 The Solar Atmosphere And Solar Wind 
The variOIlS components and thickness of the Slm 's atmosphere are discussed in Ihis 
section and dcpicted in fig. 1.3. The visi ble solar atmosphere consists of three regions 
with different physical properties. Optical photons originatc in a th in layer of plasma. a 
regi on known as the photosphere. Within this region the temperature of the gas 
del·rcaSl:s from a valllc of 6500 K at the base to a minimum of 4400 K about 500 km 
higher up. at the lOp of the photosphere. Above this point the temperaturc begins to ri se 
agam. 
Figure 1.3 The various components of the Sun's atmosphere [151. 
Above this region lies the mon: transparent chromosphere \vilh an inh:nsilY thai is only 
about 10 .... of the value of the phOlospher~ . It ext~nds upwards lOr approximately 2000 











Corona extends from the top of a narrow transition r~g ion to the earth and be-yond_ In 
this trans ition region the temper.Jture rises very rapidl y reach ing more than 101> K before 
the temperature gradient fl attens. During a total solar ecl ipse the- radiation from th.:: faint 
corona becomes \" j<; ible as shown in fig . 1.4 . 
Figure 1.4 Solclr corona seen dUring a total solar eclipse (taken by Greg BabcOCk) [t6] 
The sun does not only emit the heat we can fee l and light we can se(' but :llso \arious 
other rudiations. rhese radiations ("ontrol variations in the !:.arlh·s magnetic field and 
ionosphere and they include electromagnetic radiation, suc h as radio \\a\es, ultra\ iok1 
radiation, X-rays and charged panicle radiation consisting mainl) of protons and 
electrons, known as the solar \\ ind . 
The magneti c field of the sun is not a perfect dipole, it appears to b~ squ:lshed and 
confined to the !.!q ufltorial plane due to a solar equatorial current sheet. rhe a\'c rag~ 
position of the current sheet is tilted relative to the solar e<.juator and contl ins fo lds. 
From X-ray im:lg,"s of the sun it can 1:x: seen that the X-ra y emission is no! uni form. but 
that dark regions called coronal holes exists. Coronal hol es corresponds to those parts of 
the magnetic fi eld were the magnetic fi eld lines arc open extending Ollt to great di stances 
from the sun. These ho les source the solar wind. a cont inuos <: tream of iOlls and 
electrons follo\\ ing the magnetic lines out and away from the sun, movi ng through 
interplanetary space at a mean veloci ty of 300 to 400 km s· t [91 . Coronal holt'S occur 











plane. Thcy do howevcr move down towards this plane in a cyclic pallem and thus. 
similar to solar tlan.'S. increases the solar wind density and velocity. 
By observing the tails of comets this ongoing mass loss from the Sllll can be seen. The 
iatt..-:r are generally composed of two parts. a curved dust tail and a straight ion tail. both 
of which arc always pointed away from the sun. The force e;(ened on the dust grains by 
radiation pressure is sufficient to push it back. while the electric force between the ions 
of the solar wind and the ions in the comet accounts for the direction of the ion tail. The 
aurora borealis and the aurora australis (the nonhern and southern lights. rcspcctlvely) 
arc also products of the solar wind, this phenomena is explained in the section 3. 
1.2.3 The Solar Cycle 
Quiet sun conditions are intennillently disrupted by a variety of transient features.. some 
of which arc illustrated in fig. 1.5. 
Figure 1.5 A composite photograph of the sun showing severallorms of activity (U.S. NatIonal 











The surface of the photosphere is usually marked with dark spots of incense magneti:: 
fi eld. called sunspots. Their occurrence follows an II -year c) cle. gOing from minimum 
to maxi mum in about 4 years. Their fonnati on can be explained with the aid of fig 1.6. 
At the beginning of the cycle. the lines of magnetic force run north and south between 
the Sun's magnetic poles, This is the period of minimum magnetic activity called the 
"Solar Minimum", As the Sun rotates, the Convection Zone spins faster at the equator 
than at the roles. Beneath the Convection Zone. the Radiation Zone spins as a solid 
mass. The dilfercnt ways that these two zones move causes the Sun's magneti c field 
lines to be drawn out. 
Figure 1.6 Formation of sunspots 126l 
Spot pam in opposite hemispheres have opposite magnetic polarity and the same 
polarity as the l1earer pole. The entire magnetic field of the sun reverses after such a 
cycle and therefore the sun is said to have a 22-year cycle. The initial spots at the 
beginning of a new sunspotcyc1e appear at relati ve high latitudes and as the cyc\e 
progresses. drift slowly towards the equator. Spots that fonn later in the cyc\e appear 
closer 10 the equator. This pau{,'rTl is fairly symmetri ca l across the equator alld forms the 
















Figure 1.7 The sunspot "butterfly pattern" [14] 
Indi vidual sunspots arc short-lived features, typically not surviving morc than one month 
or so Pl. A lypic:!! sunspot is shown in fig. 1.8. The darkest centre part io; Col lled the 
umbra that C,m haw a diameter more than twice that of the earth's diameter. The umbra 
is surrounded by another dark region called the penumbra. 
Figure 1.8 A typical sunspot, showing the dark umbra and a penumbra (19) 
Sunspots appear dark because they are cooler than the surrounding gas. The 
photosphere has Ii temperature of about 5500 degrees Ce lsius and a typical sunspot has a 
temperature about 3900 degrees Celsius. Their li fetime can be as shon as an hour or t\vo 











Solar flares are eruptive events occurring near sunspots. It' s a brilliant region of intense 
emission and represents the violent illstabiliry of pan of an active-region magnetic fie ld 
and the resulting release of increased amounts of radIation and energetic particles. 
Flares have enormous dimensions with large flares reaching 100,000 kill in length. 
Flares devel op in regions of great magnetic intensity from which they draw their energy, 
namel y sunspot groups, and the enhanced radiation due to them reaches the earth 8 
minutes lmer (8). Solar flares increase solar wind density and velocity, and when 
reaching the earth 12 to 48 hours later, the wind causes a sudden compression of the 
magnetic tield, which is called a sudden impulse. 
Figure 1.9 A solar flare in comparison 10 Ihe size of the ear1h [201 . 
Sometimes energetic particles and magnetic stonns are observeJ at Earth without an y 
exceptional flare activity preceding them. but they may be associated with a different 
solar phenomenon calkd "Coronal Mass Ejections" (CMEs). CtvlEs arC huge bubblc-











Figuro 1.11 Plages are due to moderate concentrations of magnetic flux [21J. 
A solar prominence is also related to the Sun's magnetic field. Quiescent prominences 
are curtains of ionised gas that reach \vell into the corona region. Prominences are made 
up of matcriallhat collected along the magnetic field lines of an active region, therefore 
the gas is cooler and less dense than that of the surrounding coronal gas. It will then 
"rain" back down into the chromosphere causing a spectacu lar sight. 











1.3 The Earth's Magnetic Field 
The earth has a rather strong planetary dipole field. which is roughly aligned with the 
spin axis (the north magnetic IXllc is in the Northwest Territories in Canada and the 
sout h magnetic poll! in the Antarctic region). 
Figure 1.13 The earth's dipole magnetic field [22J . 
The geomagnetic field is produced and maintained in the molten iron-nickel outer core 
by the self-exiting dynamo operation of the earth. The working princ ipal is similar to 
that o f a car's alternator. The rotating earth induces the current into the electrically 
I;ondw.:ting outer core, which creates the dipole magnetic field. 
EmiSSIOns from the sun confines the Earth 's magnetic li el d 10 regIOn called the 
magnetosphere with its bowldary called the magnelopause. This magnetic field protects 
the planet from incoming charged particles in the solar wind, as well as ioni sed cosmic 
rays. Instead of stnking the surface some of the particles becomes trapped in the field 
wcrc Ihey bounce back and forth between the North and South Poles. These regions of 
trapped particles are kno\Vll as the Van Allen radiation belts. 











I..t Solar \Vind Inkl'action with tbe Magnetosphere 
The Earlh's magnetic field carves out :1 ca\'i ly in the flow of hot plasma from the sun, or 
the S<H:alled :-iolar wi nd. It wi ll push against the m::lgnetosphere on the dayside with the 
magnclopausc occurring rough ly at about 10 earth radi i \\ere the plasma pre:>smc of the 
solar wind is balanced by the magnetic field [8]. This is were the transliion region 
occur:) a.nd the e lectrons and protons composing the solar ,\ind can pt!nl:trate no dose r to 
earth and an: mostly deflected around the magnetic cavi ty. On th~ nightsi de the field is 
elongated ex tending hundreds of earth radii , This results from particle "fricti on"' with 
the so lar \\ind draggi ng the magnetic field into a cOllletlike tail. 
The in t ~'rplanetary magnetic field (due to the sun) has a com!Xlnent pl:rpl:ndicular to the 
ecliptic plane of Ihe sun. Si nce the earth lies in this plane which contains many folds 
this componen t can \<lr)' between north or south in a couple 0 1 hours, When it points 
south it will merge wi th the Earth 's magnetic iie1d, "hich 311\)\\,5 the plasma to en ler 
through that reg ion thereby "energising"the magnetosphere. 
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Another large fraction of the solar wind particles gain access at the front of the dayside 
magnetosphere by penetrating the bowshock, while the remainder are diverted around 
the magnetospheric cavity as illustrated in fig. 1.15. 
The magnetic cusp region is where the Earth's magnetic field lines change from closed 
Goined to the other hemisphere) to open (swept into the magnetic tail). This forms a 
natural access funnel for some of the recently entered plasma into the Earth's dayside 
atmosphere, see fig 1.15. Dayside aurora is then formed as these particles collide with 
the oxygen and nitrogen of the upper atmosphere. The participating particles only have 
enough energy to penetrate down to height of about 250 km, hence they are red in colour 
since that's were the red spectral emission from atomic oxygen dominate. 
The plasma that streams along the flanks of the magnetic tail forms the "mantle". The 
tail reconnects in the distance causing particles to accumulate in its central region and 
thus forming the plasma sheet. This is a stable situation as long as the build-up of the 
plasma sheet is balanced by the loss from it. Some particle loss is along field lines back 
to the interplanetary space while others flow along the magnetic field lines, which 
connect to the magnetic poles. The latter process also generates the continual "diffuse 
aurora" in the nighttime auroral zone. This "Ring of Fire" around the Auroral oval can 
clearly be seen from space, but this is not the legendary bright and spectacular polar 










wnFigure 1.16 Diffuse Aurora as seen from space (Picture taKen by the Dynamics Explorer 1 
Spacecraft ) [281. 
Figure 1.17 Sketch showing the main features of the magnetosphere [251. 
Some of the particles join the Van Allen radiation belts and whilt.: bouncing bad and 
forth between the poles will drift aroW1d the earth, electrons eastward and protons 











earth' s surface l8J. This is called the ring current anJ significantly decreases the vertical 
component (II) of the carth' s magnetic field over a period of hours. 
The tail current divides the magnetopause into two lobes. It is the source of the 
streH; hed, parallel. magnetic field lines on the nightside. This eUlTent flows ac ross the 
neutral rlane aI the equator. dosi ng the circuit across the plasma sheel. 
Magnetospheric substorms creme the really blight and spectacul ar auroras, as well as 
di srupliol1s on power and communicm ion networks. It occ urs when the sun is "ery 
aClive (large number of sunspots or coronal holes) and is the process were particles 
derived from (he substorms and ~tored in the tail is released into the earth's atmosphere. 
A magn<'"tosphcrie substonn is explained with the aid of fig. 1. 11:1. In the quiet stale the 
plasma sheet thickness tapers of with increasing distance to the neutral poi nt N. During 
a subSl0rm the thinning of th~' plasma sheet occurs near to the centre of the wi l (N') 
since the plasma sheet is unuble to contain any fUJ1her increases. The configuration is 
hi ghl y unstable and quickl y rei(lx,,:s to a morc swbk sw.te during un explosiw p1"OC~SS 
that usually takes only \u · 30 minutes. This process converts the accumulated m<tgnetic 
energy into khlCtic energy causing the particles in the plasma sheet to shoot away from 
the natur~l! point (:'J') towards t hl:~ canh. 
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Duri ng a substonn the electrical panicles is movt:d across the magnet ic field lint'S and. 
similar to the process in the alternator o f a car. an electric current will flow. This 
process. wi ll set lip a large-scale convection motion toward the ! • .'an h along the hi ghly 
conductive field lines. The current can easily flow alon g thc conductive strip in the 
aurural /onc ionosphere. Thi s giga ntic current thu s flows inward along magnetic lield 
lines to the morning pobr ionosphere, westward along the high conductivity wip in the 
ionosphere , ~Hld then along the magnetic field lines back to the equatorial piLl!le as shown 
in fig 1.1 9. 
Figure 1.19 SchematiC of th e northern hatf of the magnetospheric current system that ftows 
during a substorm in the Auroral Oval [24J. 
Tbe protons and electrons guided along magnetic fidd lines will coHiek with nitrogen 
and o .... yg('n in higb utmusphcre causi ng ionisation, excitation etc . When the alums or 
molec ules recombine. or when the electrons drop back to lower energy It.'vels. light are 
emitted whic h is then observed as the spectacular aurora borealis (northl.:T!l lights) or 
:.urora :.ustr:.lis (southern l ights). The rate of aUTor:.1 energy rci ea!)e into the upper 
almospht'rc during a moderale substorm is comparabk 10 Ih..: tota l power-generating 
capaci ty of all man-made power plants in the world and this Tl.'prcscnts perhaps only 











Figure 1.20 The spectacular Aurora Borealis (photographs by David Miller) [29). 
A similar current wedge is rormed in both hemispheres creating a relllarkahle sim il ar 
auroral form under the same magnetic line (4]. TIle non-uniform :l\Irontl currents. or 
elecuojels, follows general circular paths around the 1\vo magnetic poles at altitudes of 
100 km or more and can have magnitudes of I million amperes. This can severel y 
distort the earth' s magnetic field; during the March 1989 disturbance compass needles 
was noticeable deflected [ I]. 
~JQ nhem A urora! e Ya! SOUlnetn " urol a! Oyal 











Clearly, unlike we sometimes imagine. the eanh is not just a small planet in the endless 
black void of empty space, but surrounded by a dynamically changing region of charged 
electrical particles and magnetic and electric fields. 
Figure 1.22 The earth is surrounded by a dynamically Changing region (Illustration by K. Endo. 











1.6 Magnetic Field ,Measurements 
Thlo' K index represents the d~vialion of the earth' s magnetic fie ld from nonnal al a 
speci fi c geographi c locat ion. It serves as an indicator of the maximum variation of the 
magnetic field in a three-hour interval on the basis of a quasi-logarithmic scale (see tabl ~ 
1.1 ) with integer values from 0 (minimum activity) through 9 (super stonn). Note that 
the amplitude ranges arc unique to a particular station because o f th~ latitude 
dependence of IIlngnetic storms. 
Table 1.1 
K iudex 
limits of amplitude ranges (nT) for defining the K Index 
at the Hermanus Magnetic Observatory [81. 
o 2 J 4 5 
r-R="n::g::.cC;(:::nn""+--·3~·6--- 12 24 42 72 120 198 300 
Magneti c storm conditions ar ... comidered 10 prevail when the degree of magnetic 
acti vity is tak.en to be a K-index of 5 or greater. It is considered a major stonn when 
K-=-6 and a severe storm when K excl-cds 6 . The histogr.ull in figure 1.14 indicates the 
number o f major and severe geomagnetic storms over the past decade as measured a1 
Hennanus. Note th at the glo'neral trends an d variations as mea"ured at Henmmu~ are 
similar all over South Africa [8]. For reference purposes 1he K-indoi!.xcs of the preVIOUS 
solar peak (1/01189 - 31112192) can be fo und in appendix C. 
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Flgure 1.24 Histogram indicating the number of occurrences of 
major and severe geomagnetIC storms as measured at 











The fi gure also ill ustrate the correlation with the previous sunspot peak (cycle 22) in 
1991. Geomagnetic storms can take place at any time, however thc probability of it 
occurri ng is higher during thc occurrence o f a large number o f sunspots. Rased on the 
statistics of previous cycles the next peak, that of cycle 23, is expccted in the first 
quarter of 2000. 
It is important to note that not so much the intensity but that the sustained rate of change 
of the magnctic fi eld is an important factor [39, 40, 41 ]. Faraday 's Law can explain this: 
the electric field is associated with the time derivative of the magnctic field. not with the 
variation am plitude. Fi g 1.25 shows the rate of change of the magneti c field ovcr 24 
hours during a severe storm. This diagram also show how the K- indcx is not sufli cient 
to dctcnnine the severity of Ihe impact on the power system since the K-index of 9 after 
9 hours was not at all simi lar in magnirude to the K -9 after 2 1 hours. 
K-6 K=7 K=9 K=7 K=8 K=8 
Time [min] 
Fig 1.25 The diagram Illustrates the rate of change 01 the vertical component 01 the 













GIC Effects on Power Systems 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Power networks are more vulnerable today because of the increase in extent and 
interconnections, thus linking large cumulative earth surface potentials. Networks 
situated above igneous rock geology are most vulnerable since the relatively high 
resistance encourages more current to flow in alternative paths, such as the power lines 
located above these formations. Power systems adjacent to coastal areas are also more 
susceptible to GICs due to the large induced currents in the highly conductive seawater. 
The GIC, having a fundamental period of approximately 5 to 15 minutes [34], are a 
quasi-dc, resulting in the simultaneous ac and dc excitation of energised transformers. 
Typical perturbations to power systems due to GICs include, fluctuations is system 
voltage, increased var flow, generation of harmonics, relaying problems, localised 
heating in transformers and increased audio noise output [1; 34]. In North America, 
voltage fluctuations in excess of 10% have been reported [78]. 
Countries at mid-latitude such as South Africa are located far from the magnetic pole 
and therefore do not experience the same severity of geomagnetic disturbances such as 
in Canada, North America or Scandinavia. However, long transmission lines, high 











This chapter will elaborate on the effect of GICs on power systems, with emphasis on 
the GIC induced half-cycle saturation of power transformers, the primary cause of 
perturbations on the power system. 
2.2 Protective Relaying Effects 
The high level of harmonic distortion caused by GICs may cause conventional 
protection systems to provide inadequate protection for capacitors, transformers and 
generators [80, 83]. The transformer differential relaying scheme has apparently been 
the most vulnerable to GICs [80]. Considers a star-delta transformer with GIC flowing 
on the star side; if the GIC cause saturation it will effectively reduce the magnetisation 
impedance which will result in a current unbalance in the relay circuit. 
A risk associated with distance relays is that the saturation of a transformer can reduce 
the apparent impedance seen by the relay. If this apparent impedance is within the 
operating zone ofthe relay, an unnecessary tripping may occur [78, 80]. 
Another factor is the increased dependence of power systems on reactive power 
compensation such as shunt capacitors. These shunt capacitors are protected with 
neutral overcurrent relays. Harmonics caused due to transformer saturation will see 
these devices as a low impedance to ground and it may trip due to overcurrent. 
However, this should not be labelled a false trip since shunt capacitors need to be 
protected against overload due to harmonics. 
Transformer neutral overcurrent relays need to filtered against harmonics since triplen 
harmonics may appear as zero sequence currents and provide a "false" overcurrent to the 












The eff~ct of urcs on protection current transformers (CT) is of less concern. Since the 
core of these CT's are designed to handle large fault currents they are unlikely to 
saturate due to GTC. The only time a problem may occur is during the unlikel y event 
that a fault occur at the same time as a GIC event. To date. no significant threat to 
reliable CT performance was found 12]. 
2.3 Saturation of Power Transformers and Reactors 
A transformer core is made of high penneability ferromagnetic material. Its purpose is 
to provide a well-defined low reluctance path for magnetic fltL... . During nonnal 
operation, the majority of the flux \\~1l stay in the core. Howevcr. in the presence of 
GICs the core becomes sanirated which lead to operation in the extremely non-linear 
portion of the core steel salUration curve (see fig.2. I). Excitation current is nomlaJly 
very small for large power Iransfonners (less than 1% of rated load current) and they are 
designed to op~rale near the saturation poinL These t\.I.'O characteristics will cause low 
values of Ules to push the core into sahlralion. Due to the quasI-de nature of Gles, 
saturation will occur for one hal f of the ac cycle. hence the tenn half-cycle saturation, 
the root-cause of all power system problems that occur during geomagnetic slonns. 
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Under Gle bias the saturated core becomes a much higher reluctance path which 
requires more ampere·1UmS to produce the same amount of flux required. TIllS wi ll 
cause the transformcr 10 draw an extremely large exciting current (sec fig 2.2), rich in 
even and odd harmonics. The increased exciting current will cause a reacti ve power 
demand mueh greater than during nonnal operation for a single transformer. When a 
large number of ITan sfonners experience saturation due to OICs it will incre.1se the 
reactive power demand signi ficant when compared to either the total transformer 
demand or the tOtal area connected load. V AR demands of this magn itude can cause 
severe bus and system voltage excursions. 




Figuro 2.2 Relationship of Exciting 
Current without GIC present (in 
black). ~H1d with GIC that saturates 
tho transformer (in red). 
I .... ~.~turat;o" CUNe 
i .--.--- .. --
Excitation Current 
In effect, Gles turn the network lransformers infO sinks of reactive power and sources of 
hann onic: currents. Typical problems during a geomal:,'llctic stoml are unusual real and 










protective system operation [34]. Gles will increase generator output, decrease total 
system generation. increase transmission losses and reduce tie-line transfer capabilities. 
2.4 Transformer Heating 
The saturation of the magnetic core will also cause flux to exit the core steel for 
alternative paths, such as the tank wall, flux shields, clamps and other structural sted 
members of the transformer (see fig 2.2) . 
• _"1,,,,, 
• I • --" ... .. Figure 2.3 GIG disrupt the flux transformers [31 flow can severel path in powe 
The leakage flux due to core saturation will initiate eddy current heating in components 
linked by it and create hot spots. Hot spots can melt struchrrai steel members and are 











leading to premature Iransfonner failure. An example of such damage occurred during 
the March 1989 stonn to an 1200 MVA gt:neralor step-up (GSU) transfo rmer at a 
nuclear plant in New Jersey which was damaged beyond repai r (see fig. 2.3 ) [3 ). At the 
same time the increased excitation curren! and higher hannonic content will add 
additional healing due to j2R losses. 
Figure 2.4 Damag 
caused 10 a Iransforme 
winding due to Gle [3J 
Transformer heating due to stray fl ux is governed by the following factors [2, 351: 
• stray fl ux magnitude 
• materi al chamctcristie s (e.g. permeability and condU\..~ti vity) 
• sile of the object (e.g. clamp) perpendicular to the stray flux 
• heat transfer away from the object. 
On a wel l- monitored transformer at a different site the temperature increased on a hot 
spot from 60° to 175 0 in less than 10 minutes [3]. This can lead to very severe damage 
since geomagnetic storms can last for several hours repeated ()Vcr several days which 
will lead to the deterioration of insulation and subsequelll decrease in life span of 
transfo rmers and reactors. It was found that the failure rate of GSU transfonners are 
60% higher in the Nonheastt..'t1l US (the area of highest ole susceptibi lity) than the rest 












virtually mimics the cyclic pattern of the geomagnetic storm cycle with a time lag of 
approximately 3 years). GSU transformers of base load substations are most vulnerable 
since they are usually loaded to rated values and have limited margins to absorb 
additional heating stress [35]. 
2.5 Harmonic Generation in Transformers 
The distorted excitation current drawn during transformer half-cycle saturation is full of 
both even and odd harmonics. This can cause misoperation of protective relays such as 
SVC overcurrent relays. This was the primary cause of the Hydro-Quebec blackout 
during the severe geomagnetic storm in March 1989. The harmonics generated caused 7 
SVC's to trip on overload since their capacitive legs acted as sinks for it. Coincided with 
that the reactive power demand increased due to the half-cycle saturated transformers on 
the network. This led to severe voltage regulation problems, and ultimately to the 
collapse of the network [1]. 
The harmonic spectrum produced by transformers are generally unique to their 
construction type (five-leg core form, single phase units, etc.). The resulting current 
waveform of single-phase units will tend to be the same since they are subjected to the 
same waveform. However, transformers such as five leg core form or three phase shell 
form may produce very different waveforms since the individual phases will not 
experience the same saturation due to unbalanced magnetics [2]. 
The asymmetry caused by the dc offset in the transformer magnetisation lead to both 
odd and even harmonics. Normally utilities are well aware of odd harmonics in the 
power systems but few are prepared to handle the uncommon even harmonics. In 
general, the magnitude of harmonics decreases with an increase in the harmonic number 
and the magnitude of these harmonics increase almost linearly with an increase in the 











2.6 The Expected Performance of Eskom Power Transformers 
All single phase and three phase transformer designs are susceptible to GICs, and the 
saturation is determined by both the core configuration and the relative core leg 
dimensions [53]. The HV transformers most commonly used by Eskom are three phase, 
five limb autotransformers as well as a few single-phase units. Comparing the 
performance of all transformers the single-phase transformers are most affected by GICs 
since there are no opposing fields in the adjacent limbs [52, 53]. As far as three phase 
transformers are concerned the five legged type have showed to be the more susceptible 
to GICs by drawing more excitation current than the three legged core [52, 53]. Three-
phase three-leg core-form transformers experience the least adverse effects to GICs 
since they offer no return path to the dc flux. This is since the GIC in the neutral will 
split evenly into the three phases, and since they are in phase will induce an opposing, 
equal flux [84]. 
t 
DC flux in 
main 
I DC flux in return path 
Figure 2.5 a. DC flux return 
path for a single phase 
transformer 
t t t 
Figure 2.5 b. DC flux 
return path for a three 












Note that with autotransformers it is more difficult to make a theoretical prediction of 
the location of GICs in the power system since the current does not necessarily terminate 
at the earthing point. It can bypass the earthing point by flowing through the common 
winding to the next transformer. Therefore the GIC measured in the neutral of an 
autotransformer does not necessarily indicate its level of saturation since the measured 
value might only be a small fraction of the GIC in the series winding. The saturation of 
these transformers can be determined more accurately by rather monitoring the effects of 














Power networks are not the only technology affected by geomagnetic storms. In fact, 
the impact of these storms dates back from 1846 with reports of disruptions on the early 
telegraph systems [1]. Eventually, engineers and scientists were finding effects almost 
everywhere they looked. The first section of this chapter describes some of the 
disturbances to various technology systems during severe storms of the past. Section 3.2 
is divided into two subsections and it's focussed on past incidents related to the effect on 
power systems. Its first subsection describes some of the events known to have occurred 
internationally due to OICs. The second subsection describes the results of an 
investigation into past incidents to equipment of the Eskom MTS that can be correlated 
with geomagnetic storms. 
3.2 Disrupting Technology 
The effect of geomagnetic storms was reported on the early telegraph system with 
reports dating back to 1859 when operators in Boston and Portland were able to 
disconnect their batteries and "for more than one hour held communication with the aid 
of celestial batteries alone" [63]. OICs has been so severe at times that at times it started 
fires at telegraph stations. It has also produced outages of phone cables as well as 











Another technology greatly effected is that of pipelines. The greatest problem is the 
effect on the cathodic protection designed to prevent electrolytic corrosion at flaws in 
the pipeline coating. During a severe storm the pipe-to-soil potential vary rapidly 
making pipeline surveying almost impossible and exposing the pipeline to possible 
corrosion [39]. 
Following is a list of some of the effects during March 1989 when a number of massive 
solar flares occurred; causing some of the largest magnetic storms ever recorded (not 
including effects on power system, see following section) [8]. 
Surface Technology Problems 
• South African geophysical exploration chief reported "conditions unlike any I've ever 
seen before; nothing worked." 
• Mineral survey worker in Western Australia reported a totally disrupted survey, 
"never seen conditions quite like it." 
• Pipeline surveying company in Australia could not understand their pipe-to-soil 
potential records and became concerned about probability of increased pipeline 
corrosion due to induced currents and potentials to ground. 
• Power supply cables to undersea fibre-optic telecommunication cables monitored 
large voltage swings (500-600 V). 
Space Technology Problems 
• Stable low-altitude satellite began uncontrolled tumbling. 
• GOES-7 high orbiting satellite had communications circuit anomaly on 12 March 
1989, and lost imagery and communications on the next day. 
• Aerospace engineer concerned over power panel problems. 
• Japanese high orbiting communications satellite permanently lost half of its 
communications circuitry. 
• Ageing low orbiting NASA satellite has dropped in altitude "as if it hit a brick wall". 











Ionosphere Communications Problems 
• March 6 - NBC warned affiliates of potential relay problems during the following two 
weeks. 
• US Coast Guard reported many LORAN and HF -radio problems. 
• US Navy MARS (10-20 MHz) circuits out world-wide but 144-148 MHz transceivers 
received signals from unusual long distances. 
• Australia - many reports of poor HF-radio conditions on 13-14 March 1989. Polar to 
midlatitude circuits was useless and equatorial circuits very weak and noisy. 
3.3 Disrupting Power Systems 
Power networks are more vulnerable today because of the continual expansion and 
increase in interconnections, thus linking large cumulative earth surface potentials. 
Networks situated above igneous rock geology are most vulnerable since the relatively 
high resistance encourages more current to flow in alternative conductors such as the 
power lines located above these formations. Power systems adjacent to coastal areas are 
also more susceptible to GICs due to the large induced currents in the highly conductive 
seawater. 
3.3.1 International Incidents Related to GICs 
The Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) in collaboration with the Fingrid Power 
Company have monitored and studied GICs in the Finnish power system since 1977, i.e. 
for a longer time than the 11 year sunspot cycle. The largest GIC ever measured during 
this period occurred at Rauma on March 24, 1991. The one-minute mean value was 
201A [36]. Also during this period the largest time derivative to be measured in 
southern Finland was 40nT/s, this occurred on July 13 to 14, 1982. Despite these large 
values, the Finnish power network has not experienced any significant disruptions due to 











They pay a lot of attention to leakage flux path to minimise the occurrence of hot spots 
and the transfonners are generally only operated a half its rated value [51]. 
It is interesting to note that the Finnish neighbours, Sweden has not being as fortunate in 
escaping the detrimental effects of GICs. For instance, during the July 1982 stonn 
mentioned above, they had 4 transfonners and 15 lines tripped [36]. In fact, the first 
observations of GICs in Nordic countries was observed in Sweden, more than 70 years 
ago [44]. A comparison ofthe two networks (Sweden and Finland) has being done [44]. 
The main differences are listed in table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 The main differences between the Finish and Swedish power systems 
Finland Sweden 
Transformers Five limb, core type, full 400/130 kV, and 400/220 kV 
wound three phase three phase autotransfonners. 
transfonners (400/400/125 
MVA, 400/120/21 kV, 
YnynOdll). 
Earthing The 110 kV network is earthed The 130 kV system is solidly 
through current limiting earthed due to the 
reactors. autotransfonners. 
Reactive Power Compensation through reactors Compensation mainly through 
connected to the tertiaries of 400 kV shunt reactors 
the system transfonners connected to substation 
busbars. 
Note that previously the differential relays used in Sweden were not stable in the 











It is interesting to note that GIC values are generally lower in North America than in 
Scandinavia, however their transformers are more sensitive to these currents which is 
evident from the number of problems they have had. One of their earliest disturbances 
occurred on 24 March 1940 [80]. In the northern United States and eastern Canada they 
had disturbances on 10 separate power systems, of which misoperation of transformer 
differential relays the most common problem. In 1957 saturation of power transformers 
saturated causing excessive harmonics and another storm in 1958 caused widespread 
voltage and power flow variations [80]. Also in 1958 the Bowater Power Company 
experienced outages on 4 generators. More differential relay maloperations was 
reported occurred in 1967, 1968 and 1970. A severe impact occurred in August 1972 
which caused transformers to trip on differential relay, a capacitor ba k on overcurrent, 
undervoltage breaker operation as well as unwanted supervisory operation [80]. 
To date, probably the most dramatic effect of GICs on power systems was the Hydro-
Quebec collapse in Canada during a very severe storm in March 1989. The blackout 
affected more than 6 million customers. A total of 21 500 MW of load and generation 
was lost taking more than 9 hours to completely restore. Following is a description of 
the events that took place [1]: 
The geomagnetic disturbance occurred early in the morning of 13 March 1989 causing 
GICs in the system. This caused excessive harmonics in the system which flowed into 
nearby static V AR compensators, whose capacitive legs is a low impedance to ground 
for the high frequency harmonics. 
The harmonics overloaded the capacitors to such an extent that protective systems took 
the static V AR compensators off-line to prevent possible damage. Within a minute off 
storm onset, all seven static V AR compensators on the Hydro-Quebec 735 kV La 
Grande network tripped. This left the 9500 MW La Grande Hydroelectric complex 
without the support of voltage regulation and reactive power compensation. This, 
together with the increased reactive power demand by half-cycle saturated transformers 











About'8 seconds after the loss of the compensators, one of the five 735 kV La Grande 
lines tripped, almost immediately followed by the remaining 4 lines. This completely 
cut-off 9500 MW from the rest of the network. Frequency and voltage throughout the 
network fell. Automatic load shedding was not fast enough to restore a balance between 
load and generation available and in less than 30 seconds the entire network collapsed. 
The same storm also cased unrepairable damage to a generation step-up (GSU) 
transformer in New Jersey. The 1200 MVA, 500 kV transformer overheated due to 
stray flux causing hot spots at certain concentrations. This kind of damage can be 
cumulative and a statistical analysis of GSU transformers in the U.S. showed that the 
failure rate was 60 percent more in GIC susceptible areas [3]. It is estimated that 
another storm of this magnitude could have a $3-6 billion loss in gross domestic product 
in the northeastern United States only [33]. 
A network seemingly even more sensitive to GI s is that of the UK. With a neutral dc 
current of only 5-25A, they have reported [85]: 
• MY Ar swings on generators 
• Voltage changes ±5% 
• Demand tripping by under voltage 
• Generator negative sequence alarms 
• Increased harmonic levels 
• Bucholz trips / Transformer damage 











3.3.2 The Relation of Geomagnetic Storms and Network Equipment 
Failure in South Africa 
The investigation into correlation between past system events and geomagnetic storms 
was conducted for the peak period of activity during the previous cycle, i.e. 1989 
through 1994. The only available data was that of events concerning shunt capacitor 
banks, transformers and reactors. This data is unfortunately not sufficient to proof the 
possible existence or absence for that matter of GICs in the Eskom MTS. Data such as 
voltage change, generator MV Ar swings, increased harmonic levels etc. will be essential 
to establish conclusive proof of the existence of GICs. 
3.3.2.1 Shunt Capacitors 
No correlation between shunt capacitor trips and geomagnetic storms was found, which 
could be for numerous reasons such as network geometry, protection settings, magnitude 
of GICs, etc. It does not prove beyond doubt that there has not been any GIC related 
incidents at shunt capacitors on the network. 
3.3.2.2 Transformers and Reactors 
The results of the investigation into transformer and reactor events that could be GIC 
related are shown in table 3.2. The table also lists all major to severe storms (K-index > 
5)1 which have occurred close to the date of an incident. See appendix C for all K-index 
data from 1989 through 1992. 
1 The K-index (a I-digit number) is a 3 hourly indication of geomagnetic activity. See section 1.6 for a 











Table 3.2 Results of investigation between past system events and geomagnetic storms [86]. 
Date K-index Name Description 
sequence 
13 Mar 1989 56797889 
14 Mar 1989 97653466 
15 Mar 1989 64433332 Poseidon- Permanent fault on the reactor; 
Neptune Reactor interwinding fault 
28 July 1990 24566566 Beta Reactor 4 Internal fault; reactor was removed on 
8/09/90 
24 Mar 1991 28665378 
25 Mar 1991 66434555 
26 Mar 1991 65557443 Hydra Permanent fault; reason unknown 
Transformer 21 
18 Apr 1991 Beta Reactor 4 Neutral earthing reactor faulted 
18 Apr 1991 Beta Reactor 2 Internal fault 
19 Jun 1991 Hydra Reactor 2~ Permanent fault, reactor was removed 
14 Aug 1991 Beta Reactor 4 Neutral earthing reactor faulted and was 
disconnected 
19 Aug 1991 43754322 Hydra Permanent transformer fault; 
Transformer 21 transformer removed 
25/05/92 Hydra Transformer tripped on Buchholz 
Transformer 3 protection 
06 May 1993 Hydra Reactor 1 Reactor faulted internally. To be 
replaced. 
14 Dec 1993 Beta Alpha 2 Red phase winding faulted. 
Reactor 
21 Mar 1994 Hydra Poseidon 1 Reactor faulty and replaced 
Reactor 











These incidents provide circumstantial evidence tat OICs might exist in the Eskom 
MTS. From this data it appears that the Hydra and Beta substations may be susceptible 
to OICs. It is also interesting to note that the Poseidon-Neptune reactor that failed was 
commissioned less than one year before it failed and was removed [87]. Unfortunately 
the only investigation report available for the above incidents is the failure of the two 
765 kV shunt reactors at Beta. An extract from this report by Eskom Transmission 
Oroup is available in appendix D. The observations made at Rotek correspond exactly 
to the damage that would be caused by OICs. The following quotes highlight some of 
these observations: 
"3.3 The upper shunts controlling the leakage flux from the winding 
returning to the yokes showed signs of overheating. The shunt insulation 
had also deteriorated 
3.4 At the tips of three upper magnetic shunts on the line side, a 
number of laminations had spread open and bent towards the yoke. They 
had penetrated the insulation causing electrical contact. The yoke 
laminations had melted at these points. 
3.5 Molten metal particles from the yoke laminations were found 
between some of the winding conductors. " 
"The shunts collecting the stray flux from the winding situated at the top 
neutral end of the winding overheated due to high flux density. " 
The estimated costs only for repairs at Beta alone was R 4 892 000 in 1991. 
Note that it is rarely the case that transformer or reactor failure occurs at the exact same 
time as a geomagnetic storm [84]. Normally the overheating or hot spots will cause 
insulation breakdown, which will effectively decrease the expected life span of the 
equipment. At times the overheating may become so severe that part of the magnetic 
circuit, such as the leakage flux shunts, may melt and short out windings below as in the 












Modelling and Predicting GICs 
4.1 Introduction 
The theoretical evaluation of GICs in power networks can be divided into two parts: 
• Network calculation: to calculate the GICs produced by this electric field in the 
different parts of the system. This is done by using Ohm and Kirchhoff's laws as 
well as Thevenin's theorem 
• Geophysical calculation: to calculate the earth surface potential (ESP) from 
Maxwell's equations. 
By combining these two steps the GIC at every substation can then be calculated. This 
chapter will address these two steps and describe how they are combined to predict the 
GIC at different substations during a geomagnetic storm. 
4.2 Network Calculation 
4.2.1 Model Description 
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the ESP caused by geomagnetic fluctuations will cause the 
GIC to flow into the power system. After entering the transformer through the neutral, it 
will split equally among the three phases of the transformer into the transmission line. 
From there it will terminate at the star point of the next transformer. In the case of an 
autotransformer, this current does not need to terminate at the earth point, and may flow 











~ TRANSMISSION LINE 
GIC m eARTH SURFACE ill GIC 
L----------I+ II 1------
Figure 4.1 Induced voltage 
drives GIC through the neutral EARTH-SURFACE 
ground points of power POTENTIAL 
transformers. 
Since it is quasi-de current, network equipment and transmission lines will be 
represented by only their dc-resistances and the three phases are considered to be in 
parallel. The source is represented by an idealised voltage source and exists between the 
grounded neutrals or ground mats (see fig. 4.2b) with a finite resistance to remote earth. 
Since an accurate value of this resistance is not available for all substations, it can be 
assumed to be O.ln at the coast and o.sn inland [43, 44, and 49]. Transformers are 











Symbols used in figure 4.2 are: 
RL = line resistance per phase. 
Ry = resistance of grounded 
star-connected winding per 
phase. 
Rs = autotransformer series 
winding resistance per phase. 
Rc = autotransformer common 
winding resistance per phase. 
Rgi = grounding resistance of 
bus i. 
Ini = neutral GIe at bus i. 






Figure 4.2a Sample network to illustrate modelling 
procedure 
BUS1 RL~ BUS2 R&3 BUS3 
. + , 
\ I 'y Vesp1 
1 






Figure 4.2b DC model of sample network 
At some sites there is more than one transformer in parallel (as well as shunt reactors) 
which will correspondingly change the value of the transformer resistance. 
The ac resistance of overhead transmission lines is normally reduced by 5% (skin effect 
factor) to give dc resistance. The effect of shield wires can be neglected since their high 
resistance as well as tower footing resistance limits currents through it, also since the 











4.2.2 Network Configuration 
The following procedure to calculate the contribution of the network configuration to 
determine GICs has been derived by Lehtinen & Pirjola [42]. Note that bold letters will 
be used to represent vectors. 
The earthing points of the network are defined by PI, ... , pm (fig. 4.3). All these points 
have earthing resistances Rl... Rm, which are the sum of the dc resistance of the 
transformer and the resistance of the transformer earth to true earth. Each pair of points 
(Pi, Pj) is interconnected by a transmission line with resistance Rij. This value will be 
infinite should a pair of points not be connected. Current flowing in between nodal 
point Pi and Pj is denoted Ii and the earthing current at a node Pj is denoted by Ij with the 





Figure 4.3 Definition of symbols used for a transmission network 
The earthing resistance is described by the earthing impedance matrix Z. Since no time 
dependence exists for the quasi-dc GIC, all the elements of the matrix will be real. The 
earthing point is assumed to be far enough from each another so that the earthing current 
at one point does not affect the potential at another point. This assumption will imply 
that the earthing impedance matrix is simply a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements 
equal to the earthing resistances Ri. The values of these elements are the sums of the 













The electric field at the earth's surface without the conductor network is denoted EO(r, t) 
and is called the open-circuit electric field. Let sij denote the path of the line between a 
pair of nodal points Pi and Pj- The open-circuit electromotive force between these points 
can thus be defined as the path integral of the open-circuit electric field EO along the path 
v; = JEo .dl (4.1) 
sij 
When the conducting circuit is included in the calculation it will introduce two fields 
Ecur and Eind• The latter is due to time variations of the currents in the conductors. The 
former arises due to the flow of GIC current in the earthing resistance Rj and line 
resistance Rij. Therefore, the closed circuit field Ee and corresponding electromotive 




Once again, because of the quasi-dc nature of GICs, Eind and thus v;nd can be ignored. 
For the same reason the field Ecur has a single-valued potential, u;ur wit respect to true 
earth and can be calculated as follow: 












From Kirchoff s voltage law the potential inside the loop between a pair of point pi and 
pj will be (see fig 4.4) 
(4.6) 
Figure 4.4 The closed loop between two nodal points Pi and Pi 
And from Kirchoff s current law the currents at the nodal points will be defined by 
lie = I/;i = -I/; (4.7) 
j# j*i 
Solving for Iij from equation (4.6) and substituting into (4.7) yields 
r = - ,,(VO +Ucur _u~ur)/ R~ 
I ~ IJ I J IJ (4.8) 
j*; 
which can also be written as 
v o U cur r = -" -1L_u~ur,,_l + "_J_" (4.9) 
I ~ Rn I ~ Rn ~ Rn 
j*; ij j# ij j*i ij 
The network admittance matrix is defined as 
(4.10) 
Once again because of the assumed time independence of GICs, the elements of the 











Equation (4.9) can then be simplified to 
I V,~ I r = - -.!L _ U~uryn _ ynU~ur , .. Rn , " .. I) J 
J'" ij J'" 
A column vector .f is defined by 
Jt = IJ;i 
j .. i 
where 
Therefore equation (4.11) can be written as 
lie = IJ;i - IY;Ur 
j .. i j 
and thus 
which from equation (4.5) can be written as 








Equation (4.16) can be expressed as a complete matrix equation 
and therefore to calculate the earthing currents 




where Y is the network admittance matrix and Z the earthing impedance matrix. The 
elements of this column vector Ie depend only on the resistance and structure of the 
power system. They are therefore not the GIC value at the nodal points but a 











These network constants must be calculated respectively for an eastern and northern 
electric field of 1 V Ikm, i.e. by changing the elements of column matrix .r. If the electric 
field is known the constants are used to calculate the GIC as follow: 
IGIC = aEx + bEy (4.19) 
where "a" is the GIC for the eastward surface potential of IV/km and "b" the GIC for a 
northern surface potential of 1 V Ikm. These surface potentials of 1 V Ikm are constant 
and independent of the geology. The actual or theoretical electric field is represented by 
Ex and Ey which will determine the magnitude of the GIC at the site. Ex represents the 
electric field in the northern direction and Ey the eastern electric field. 
Section 4.2 will elaborate on the calculation of the electric field and section 4.3 will 
show by means of an example how these calculations are applied. 
4.3 Geophysical Calculation 
Countries located at high latitudes beneath the auroral zone will generally use a three 
dimensional model to calculate local earth surface potentials (ESP). The ionospheric 
current is assumed to be one million amperes, about 600 km long, 450 km thick, and 
located at about 120 km above the earth surface [35]. This detail is not necessary for 
countries at mid-latitude such as South Africa where it is sufficient to assume an infinite 
current sheet with a spatially constant current density [50, 66]. The primary field is thus 
a vertically propagating plane wave. 
The model for regional geology depends on the conductivity, permeability and 
permittivity of the area considered. A uniform earth model can be assumed when using 











The procedure to calculate the electric field has been derived by Viljanen and Pirjola 
[68]. The earth is described as a half-space with a constant conductivity of (j and the 
geomagnetic field propagates as a vertical plane wave in the earth. Using Cartesian co-
ordinates, the x-axis is directed to the magnetic north, y to the magnetic east and z 
downwards. The electric field is then obtained by 
(4.20) 
where ~ is the sampling interval, N is the sample number, M = 10 [66] and 
N 
RN = ~>n.JN-n+l (4.21) 
n~N-M+1 
where bn = Bn - Bn-l (B being the magnetic component). 
Since magnetic and electric fields are perpendicular, Ex will be calculated from By and 
Ey from Bx. A simplified example has been included in appendix E to illustrate step by 












4.4 Example Of Calculating GICs 
The following example will illustrate how Ole can be calculated at various substations 
of an interconnected transmission network. The model will consist of six 400 k V 
substations numbered 1 through 6 as shown in fig 4.5. 
1 
4 
5 6 Figure 4.5 Single line diagram of model 
4.4.1 Network Constants 
The line data necessary to calculate the admittance matrix (equation 4.10) is shown in 
the table below. 
Table 4.1 Line resistances between any pair of connected substations (see comments at end of table) 
Station Numbers No. of lines Voltage Line length Line type Rpu/km Line resistance 
j [kV] [km] n 
Rij [Q] 
1 2 2 400 320 Twin Dinosaur 0.000015 1.280 
2 3 2 400 125 Twin Dinosaur 0.000015 0.500 
2 6 1 400 215 Quad Wolf 0.000030 3.440 
3 4 1 400 105 Quad Wolf 0.000030 1.680 
3 5 2 400 257 Twin Dinosaur 0.000015 1.028 
5 6 1 400 262 Quad Wolf 0.000030 4.192 
Comments: To determine the actual line resistance Rij, the following formula is used: 
Ract = Rpu *(Vline)/(Sbase) 
where Rpu = (RpJkm)*{line length), Vline = 400 kVand, Sbase = 100 MVA 
This value must then be divided by three to take into account that it is a three-phase 
conductor. That value must again be divided by the number of three phase lines in 











From table 4.1 and equation (4.10) the admittance matrix can be calculated: 
0.781 -0.781 0 0 0 0 
-0.781 3.072 -2.000 0 0 -0.291 
yn= 0 -2.000 3.568 -0.595 -0.973 0 
0 0 -0.595 0.595 0 0 
0 0 -0.973 0 1.212 -0.239 
0 -0.291 0 0 -0.239 0.530 
As mentioned in section 4.1.2 the earthing impedance matrix is a diagonal matrix with 
real elements. These values are the sum of the resistances of the transformers with all 
three phases in parallel, and the actual earthing resistances. As mentioned in section 
4.1.1 the latter is generally assumed to be 0.10 at the coast and 0.50 inland [43, 44, and 
49]. For the model the transformer and reactor resistances will be assumed to be equal 
for all substations with a value of 0.3 0 ( 0.9 0 = 0.3 0). If there are more than one 
3 
transformer or reactor at a site in parallel the value have to be changed correspondingly. 
However, this has been shown to be insignificant at times since, depending on the 
model, the line resistances are dominating and therefore changing the earthing resistance 
had almost no effect on the calculated value [43]. The necessary data to calculate the 
earthing impedance matrix is shown in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Data necessary to calculate the earthing impedance matrix. The diagonal 
elements of the Ze are those shown in the last column. 
Substation Actual earthing No of transformers No of reactors Calculated earthing 
No resistance [0] at substation at substation resistance R~ [0] 
1 0.1 2 1 0.13 
2 0.5 2 0 0.40 
3 0.5 2 0 0.40 
4 0.5 2 0 0.40 
5 0.1 2 1 0.13 











The final values to be calculated are those of the column matrix.r (see equation 4.12 & 
4.13). This matrix must be calculated twice, once for an eastern and once for a northern 
electric field of 1 V Ikm. The following table lists these values. 
Table 4.3 Calculating the column vector Je. For calculating the horizontal and vertical 
distances, sUbstation 1 was used as a reference pOint. As mentioned in section 4.1.2, 
positive direction is assumed to be into earth, therefore the values for substations to the 
east and north are assumed negative and visa versa. 
Substation Connected Line Horizontal Vertical J~ J~ 
No to resistance [0] surface surface 
Horizontal Vertical 
potential M potential M 
1 2 1.280 250 175 195.31 136.72 
2 1 1.280 -250 -175 79.22 -28.58 
3 0.500 130 25 
6 3.440 50 200 
3 2 0.500 -130 -25 -41.06 108.84 
4 1.680 90 -60 
5 1.028 170 200 
4 3 1.680 -90 60 -53.57 35.71 
5 3 1.028 -170 -200 -225.01 -200.52 
6 4.192 -250 -25 
6 2 3.440 -50 -200 45.10 -52.18 











Combining these values through equation (4.18) the network constants (or GIC values 
for a constant field of 1 V/km) can be determined: Ie = (1 + Y"Zert.f 
Table 4.4 The network constant value "a" is the value for an 
eastward surface potential of 1V/km and "b" that for a northern 
surface potential of 1V/km. 
Substation No a b 
1 126 188 
2 5 39 
3 42 -19 
4 37 -47 
5 -163 -198 
6 -47 36 
Once the actual electric field is known the GIC can be calculated for each substation 
individually, from equation (4.19): IGIC = aEx + bEy. The electric field will be calculated 











4.4.2 Magnetic Data and GIC 
An example of the results during a very severe storm is given in figure 4.6 where the 
predicted ole at substation 5 of the model is compared to the magnetic field (X and Y), 
as well as the magnetic field variation (dXldt and dY/dt). The magnetic data used for 
the graph were sampled over a 120 second interval for a period of 180 minutes during a 
very severe storm (K = 9). The detailed magnetic data and corresponding electric field 
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Top panel: X (thin line) and Y (thick line) at substation 5 during very severe 
storm of 13 March 1989. Note that X is normalised around 9500 nT and Y 
around -4000 nT. 
Middle panel: dXldt (thin line) and dY/dt (thick line). Zero levels are plotted with 
dashed lines. 












4.4.3 Interpretation of Results 
From table 4.4 it is evident that the most susceptible substations are 1 and 5. The main 
reason for this is the fact that they are at the ends of the longest effective span of the 
network. Distance plays a major role since the earth surface potential will increase 
linearly with the distance between the nodes. Another contributing factor is the fact that 
both these substations have very little earthing resistance (see table 4.2), however this 
will not dominate the GIC value since the line resistance is higher and therefore of more 
significance. In fact, it was shown that on some networks the value of the earthing 
resistances have almost no effect [43]. 
Table 4.6 shows how different values of the earthing resistance influence the GIC. From 
the table it is evident that substations 1 and 5 will be the most susceptible even when all 
substations are allocated the same earthing resistance value. Combined with the fact that 
the magnitude does not change drastically it shows that the line length and also the fact 
that GICs have to terminate at these end points playa more significant role than the 
earthing resistance. 
Table 4.6 The influence of earthing resistance value on the GIC 
R~,5 = O.13Q R; = O.13Q R~ = O.13Q All substations: 
R ;,3,4,6 = 0.40Q R ~,2,3,4,6 = 0.40Q R ;,3,4,5,6 = 0.40Q R~ = 0.40Q 
Substation No a b a b a b a b 
1 126 188 108 162 124 186 107 160 
2 5 39 16 55 0 32 10 48 
3 42 -19 45 -13 27 -37 31 -31 
4 37 -47 38 -46 34 -50 35 -49 
5 -163 -198 -162 -196 -131 -159 -130 -158 











This table also shows that substation 4 is least affected by changing the earthing 
resistance at 1 and 5. This is since is substation 4 is remote from the mesh network and 
therefore not significantly influenced by the "line" of current between 1 and 5 (see fig 
4.5). The line connecting 3 to 4 is also much higher than that connecting 3 to 5. 
It was also found that changing the value of the earthing resistance at substation 6 had 
almost no influence on its GIC magnitude. This is since the lines connecting it with 2 
and 5 has very high resistance compared to the earthing resistance at 6 and are therefore 
dominant on the GIC magnitude. 
Figure 4.6 comparing the predicted GIC at substation 5 to the magnetic field (X and Y), 
as well as the magnetic field variation (dXldt and dY Idt) shows clearly that the GIC is 
more dependant on the rate of change of the magnetic field rather than its magnitude. 
This is as expected since from Faraday's law it is known that the magnitude of the 
electric field is related to the rate of change of the magnetic field. There is no simple 













Measurements and Mitigation 
5.1 Introduction 
GIC interaction with a power system is a non-linear phenomenon (due to the presence of 
the magnetic core) and requires direct measurement to accurately determine its 
magnitude and effects. Parameters of importance will be the variation of the magnetic 
field, the magnitude ofthe GIC in the transformer neutral and the level of the saturation 
caused by it. The latter will be evident through measurements such as harmonic 
distortion, reactive power demand, transformer noise and transformer heating. Section 
5.1 will elaborate more on the measurements as proposed here. 
Through mitigation the detrimental effects of GICs can be limited and even avoided. 
Both passive and active devices have been developed for this purpose. Another popular 
alternative is through system operations i.e., changing the network during the event of a 












There are three main methods to monitor GICs [2]: 
• Measure perturbations of the earth's magnetic field in terms of its variation with time 
dB/dt 
• Measure the GIC in the transformer neutrals or transmission lines 
• Measure the adverse effects on the network such as transformer saturation; this is 
done through parameters such as harmonic distortion, reactive power demand etc. 
Magnetic data such as dB/dt and values of the K-index is available from magnetic 
observatories. Once such an institution in South Africa is that of the CSIR in Hermanus. 
If this data is available on a real time basis it can be used to warn network controllers of 
a magnetic storm to which they can react and effectively minimise the GIC. This will be 
discussed in section 5.2. 
The GIC is usually measured in the transformer neutral since it is easier and more 
practical compared to installing a dc transformer on a transmission line. The problems 
with the latter are that dc transformers for transmission line voltages are quite limited 
and it is more difficult to install. A method adopted in Finland to measure GICs in the 
transmission lines was by using a magnetometer near a 400 kV line in Porvoo [36]. This 
can be done in very isolated areas since this instrument is very sensitive to other 
disturbances. 
The half-cycle saturation of the transformer not only depends on the GIC in the neutral 
but also on its load which will push it beyond the knee-point of the saturation curve. 
Monitoring methods that can indicate this level are the following: 
• Harmonic distortion 
• Reactive power demand 
• Noise level of transformer 











The EPRI SUNBURST program is a global monitoring network used by participating 
utilities. Its purpose is to provide a database for multiple sites regarding the effects of 
similar disturbances on different network configurations as well as various transformer 
types and designs. The harmonic components measured by this system are those of the 
second to the eight. The reactive power demand at a site can also be calculated from this 
system since it measure the current and voltage on each side and determines the phase 
angle relationship. The increase in reactive power demand of the system instead of 
individual equipment can also be measured at various generators and reactive power 
compensators who will attempt to provide this extra demand. 
Transformer noise will occur because the ferromagnetic material changes size slightly 
when magnetised causing the vibration of the lamella of the core. This level increases 
drastically during half-cycle saturation due to the increased magnetisation and presence 
of harmonics. This indicates undesired mechanical strain of the transformer and will 
also be a psychological problem in power transformers operate near human activity [54]. 
Transformer heating takes place when the leakage flux from the saturated core causes 
hot spots. This heating can be quite dramatic and cause the failure of transformers such 
as the GSU transformer (as mentioned in section 3.2.1) that was damaged beyond repair. 
Another well-monitored transformer had a rapid rise in internal heating due to GIC when 
the temperature of a hot spot on the tank increased from 60°C to over 175°C in as few as 
10 minutes. 
Since measuring equipment is very expensive to buy, install and maintain it should only 
be installed at sites most ·susceptible. These sites can be identified through the 
modelling of the network. Generally the sampling interval to measure GICs are 10 s 












5.3.1 Passive Devices 
Due to the quasi-dc nature of GICs devices such as Transmission Line Series Capacitors 
can block their flow. Although such devices will provide additional line impedance 
compensation and increase the power flow transfer limit, they are not feasible for the 
sole purpose of blocking GICs. Very low impedance capacitors make this method more 
cost effective. These devices offer almost no compensation, and hence have very little 
voltage across them [35]. 
Another method that is under investigation is the installation of a series capacitor in the 
transformer neutral. This device has a by-pass circuit in parallel with it for the purpose 
of shunting fault currents. This method might however interfere with the safe operation 
of the ac system [62]. 
5.3.2 Active Devices 
Research was done to investigate the possibility of a controlled dc circuit in a special 
purpose winding on the transformer core [35]. This dc current tertiary winding would 
produce a counter MMF to that of the GIC. This method was however deemed non-
successful by the investigators. 
5.3.3 Operational Mitigation 
Breaking the network into smaller sections can drastically reduce the flow of GICs, 
especially in a long interconnected network such as the Eskom MTS. However care has 
to be taken when using this method since blindly breaking the network could actually 











The method is especially attractive for networks with series compensated lines. This is 
since taking out non-compensated lines can reduce the flow of GICs while still 
supplying sufficient power flow through series compensated lines. It is also the most 
cost- and time-effective method. 
Operational mitigation is even more effective when the operators are given a lead-time 
to a geomagnetic storm. This is now possible through a company that predicts storm 
onset through observations from space (utilising the ACE satellite) of the formation of 












Conclusions and Recommendations 
Geomagnetic storms occur when the charged particles of the solar wind caused by a 
Coronal Mass Ejection on the sun are captured by the earth's dipole magnetic field. The 
perturbation of this magnetic field will cause an electric field on the earth's surface. 
This field is the source of GICs through the earthed transformer neutral. These storms 
are of a cyclic nature and peak every eleventh year. 
The quasi dc GIC will cause an offset of the core magnetisation which could lead to half 
cycle saturation of a transformer if it supplies a big enough load. This could lead to all 
kinds of detrimental effects such as harmonics, reactive power swings, transformer 
overheating etc. This has happened in many countries at high latitude since they 
experience a more severe perturbation of the magnetic field than countries at mid 
latitude such as South Africa. However, the modelling does implicate that network 
configuration is as important factor as the induced electric field. Therefore utilities at 
mid-latitude such as Eskom could experience harmful GICs due to factors such as long-
interconnected lines. The techniques to determine the effect of the network 
configuration and electric field were provided. 
Eskom has been aware since about 1990, that occasional severe geomagnetic storms in 
the Southern Cape might disrupt the MTS in that area. At that time no correlation was 
observed between disruptions at selected sites of the Eskom MTS and geomagnetic 
activity. (The sites selected were based on the knowledge at that time.) However, an 
investigation into the past events on the Eskom MTS and correlation with geomagnetic 











rands. Since this has happened during the previous solar peak (1991) to much time has 
passed and therefore detailed information was unavailable. This evidence suggests that 
the sites most susceptible are not at the conventionally accepted locations, and that 
damage and disruption may have occurred where it was not expected. Circumstantial 
evidence such as the failure of a reactor at Poseidon and Beta substations has been 
provided. The damage caused at these sites correlated very closely with geomagnetic 
storms and the extend of the damage is what is expected from GICs. It was also found 
that the core types of the power transformers generally used by Eskom are susceptible to 
GICs. Measurement techniques and mitigation methods were also provided, this could 
be applied to the Eskom MTS. 
In light ofthe findings the following recommendations are made: 
• Develop a complete network model and identify all the most sensitive locations 
• Investigate for a correlation (if any) between the sites most susceptible from the 
theoretical modelling and past system events seemed to be caused by GICs 
• Installation of monitors and sensors at most susceptible sites 
• Train system controllers and develop a pro-active response so mitigation plans can 
be prepared as an operational mitigation technique 
• Train network planners to apply mitigation techniques for future planning 
• Review existing project implementation plans for installation of series capacitors to 
reduce the sensitivity ofthe network to GICs 
This project provides information on the mechanism, impact and influencing factors of 
geomagnetically induced currents. The report also suggests that the Eskom MTS may 
be susceptible to it. Future research could establish the severity of GICs in the Eskom 
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GEOMAGNETICALLY INDUCED CURRENTS IN ESKOM'S MTS 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
18 November 1999 
Introduction 
This report has been prepared for Eskom Technology Group to serve as feedback on the literature 
review done by J Koen as part of the above-mentioned project, which commenced in January 1999. 
The review covered all three aspects of the project namely, astrophysics, geophysics and engineering. 
This report is submitted through the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University of Cape 
Town and presents a bibliography of GIC literature relevant to the project. 
GIC Related Literature 
This section lists the sources obtained to review the present understanding of mechanism of GICs and 
effects on power network equipment. The sources were mostly from journals. Other sources included 
theses, the Internet and reports. 
A complete reference of a source is given in the list below, each followed by a short description of the 
information obtained or available through that source. 
1. Viljanen, A., "Geomagnetic induction in a one- or two- dimensional earth due to horizontal 
ionospheric currents", Finnish Meteorological Institute Contributions, Helsinki, 1992. 
The thesis discusses the various methods available to calculate the secondary electric field due to 
geomagnetic induction. 
2. Kappenman, J.G., Albertson, V.D., "Bracing for the Geomagnetic Storms", IEEE Spectrum 
Magazine, pp. 27-33, March 1990. 
A good general introduction to GICs discussing the sun as source, why and how it effects power 
systems, and a description of the Hydro-Quebec blackout in March 1989. 
; 










3. Pirjola, R., and Viljanen, A., "On Geomagnetically Induced Currents in the Finnish 400kV Power 
System by an Auroral Electrojet Current", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 4, No.2, 
pp. 1239 - 1245, April 1989. 
The paper derives gives an expression to determine the earth surface electric field assuming a two-
layered earth model. 
4. Kappenman, J.G., et aI., "Geomagnetic Storms can Threaten Electric Power Grid", Earth in 
Space, Vol. 9, No.7, pp. 9-11, March 1997. 
A good informative paper which discusses the potential disruption due to GICs as well as financial 
implications and forecasting methods for mitigation. 
5. Albertson, V., D., et aI., "Load-Flow Studies in the Presence of Geomagnetically Induced 
Currents", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-IOO, No.2, pp. 594-
607, February 1981. 
One of the first papers to discuss the modelling of a network to determine expected GIC magnitude. It 
presents the results of load flow analysis beginning with earth-surface potential and the modelling of 
the power system and transformers in a load flow program. The paper also elaborates on the 
implications ofGICs on a network. 
6. Transmission and Distribution Committee Working Group on Geomagnetic Disturbances and 
Power System Effects, "Geomagnetic Disturbance Effects on Power Systems", IEEE 
Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 8, No.3, pp. 1206-1215, July 1993 
The paper briefly discusses almost every single aspect of GICs. It is a very good summary of the 
source, effect and mitigation ofGICs. 
7. Viljanen, A., and Pirjola, R., "Geomagnetically Induced Currents in the Finnish High Voltage 
Power System", Surveys in Geophysics, Vol. 15, pp. 383 - 408, 1994. 
Detailed discussion of the earth surface potential as calculated and measured in Finland 
8. Sutcliffe, P.R., Kotze, P.B., "Proceedings of the Workshop on the Hermanus Magnetic 
Observatory's Geophysical Services", Hermanus Magnetic Observatory, pp. 1-61, February 1992. 
The notes describe the physics of geomagnetic storms and GICs. It also covers the severity of 
geomagnetic field variations in South Africa. 
9. Hruska, J., et aI., "The major storm of 13-14 March 1989: Its character in Canada and some 
effects", STPW Proceedings, October 1989. 
A detailed description of the magnetic storm that led to the col/apse of the Hydro-Quebec power 
system in March 1989. 










10. Viljanen, A., "The relation between geomagnetic variations and their time derivatives and 
implications for estimation if induction risks", Geophysical Research Letters, Vol. 24, No.6, pp 
631-634, March 15, 1997. 
The paper shows that the main concern during a geomagnetic storm is the rate of change of the 
magnetic field instead of the amplitude of the variation. It concludes that the geoelectric field can 
have large values in any direction, not only parallel to the electro jet. 
11. Viljanen, A., "Relation of Geomagnetically Induced Currents and Local Geomagnetic 
Variations", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 13, No.4, pp. 1285-1290, October 1998. 
A comparison of two models to calculate GICs from the time derivative of the magnetic field. The first 
model is a plane wave with homogenous earth and the second is an impulse response between the GIC 
and time derivative of the magnetic field. From this paper one can conclude that the former method 
should be an accurate way to model the Eskom MTS 
12. Lehtinen, M., Pirjola, R., "Currents produced in earthed conductor networks by geomagnetically-
induced electric fields", Annalas Geophysicae, Vol. 3, No.4, pp. 479-484, 1985. 
A very good paper explaining the derivation of the matrix method necessary to complete the 
engineering step. 
13. Pirjola, R., Lehtinen, M., "Currents produced in the Finnish 400kV power transmission grid and 
in the Finnish natural gas pipeline by geomagnetically-induced electric fields", Annalas 
Geophysicae, Vol. 3, No.4, pp. 485-491, 1985. 
This paper is a follow up of the previous mentioned paper. It describes the application of the matrix 
derived to determine GICs in the Finnish 400kV network. 
14. Elovaara, J., et aI., "Geomagnetically Induced Currents in the Nordic Power System and their 
effects on Equipment, Control, Protection and Operation", Cigre, 1992. 
The paper compares the Finnish and Swedish Power Systems. The comparison was done since the 
Swedish grid have experienced may more disruption than in Finland although the countries are 
located next to each other. It is interesting to note that the Eskom network may be more similar to 
that of Sweden than Finland. 
15. Boteler, D.H., Bui-Van, Q., Lemay, J., "Directional sensitivity to geomagnetically induced 
currents of the Hydro-Quebec 735kV power system", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 
9, No.4, October 1994. 
A description of a model used to calculate GICs. The model is then used to compare GIC magnitudes 
while varying the direction of the magnetic field The results serve to indicate a possible worst case 
scenario. 










16. Towle, J.N., Prabhakara, F.S., Ponder, J.Z., "Geomagnetic effects modelling for the PJM 
interconnection system; Part I - Earth surface potentials computation", IEEE Transactions on 
Power Systems, Vol. 7, No.3, August 1992. 
A description of the modelling of the Pennsylvania - New Jersey - Maryland (P JM) Interconnection 
to calculate GICs. This model is very complex since it consists of 11 different earth resistivity regions 
and a three dimensional ionospheric source. 
17. Prabhakara, F.S., et aI., "Geomagnetic effects modelling for the PJM interconnection system; Part 
II - Geomagnetically induced current study results", IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 
7, No.2, May 199i 
This paper follows on the Towle et alone describing a method to calculate GICs. This was done for 
different ionospheric sources and used to compare different mitigation methods. 
18. Rackliffe, G.B., et aI., "Simulation of Geomagnetic currents induced in a power system by 
magnetohydrodynamic eletromagnetic pulses", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 3, 
No. I, pp 392-397, January 1988. 
The paper discusses the effect of a magnetohydrodynamic-electromagnetic pulse (MHD-EMP) on a 
power system. This is of importance since it will produce quasi-de currents in a power system, similar 
to a geomagnetic storm. 
19. Kappenman, J.G., "Geomagnetic Storms and Impacts on Power Systems: Lessons Learned from 
Solar Cycle 22 and Outlook for Solar Cycle 23", IEEE Power Engineering Review, May 1996 
This paper discusses the threat to power systems as well as the improvements in geomagnetic storm 
forecasting. 
20. Takasu, N., et aI., "An exp rimental analysis if dc excitation of transformers by geomagnetically 
induced currents", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 9, No.2, April 1994. 
The paper discusses the results of excitation tests done on various small-scale transformer models. 
This was done by analysing the excitation current. 
21. Lu, S., Liu, Y., "FEM analysis of dc saturation to assess transformer susceptibility to 
geomagnetically induced currents", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 8, No.3, July 
1993. 
The paper presents the result of a systematic finite element simulation of transformer susceptibility to 
GIC. It contributes to the understanding of transformer magnetisation due to GICs and the analysis is 
done on 5 different transformers. 
1 although this is the second of the two papers it was published before part 1 










22. Aspnes, J.D., Merritt, R.P., Akasofu, S.I., "Harmonic generation in transformers related to dc 
excitation and system loading", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-
100, No.4, Aprill98l. 
A series of tests were run with small transformers to determine the harmonic generation from 
saturation. 
23. Aspnes, J.D., Akasofu, S.I., "Effect of Solar Induced Current on Autotransformer Tertiary 
Windings", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-lOl, No.3, March 
1982. 
The discussion is on an Alaskan three-legged transformer and the reaction of the tertiary current to 
the neutral DC current. The protection of the transformer is also discussed. 
24. Douglas, D.A., "Current Transformer Accuracy with Asymmetric and High Frequency Fault 
Currents", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-100, No.3, pp 1006-
1012, March 1981. 
Extensive discussion of CT modelling with some detail about saturation due to inrush which may be 
related to GIC. 
25. IEEE Communications Committee Working Group on Solar Effects, "Solar Effects on 
Communications", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 7, No.2, pp 460-467, April 1992. 
The paper considers the effect of geomagnetic storms on a different technology, communications. It 
also gives a good explanation of the cause of geomagnetic storms. 
26. Boteler, D.H., "Geomagnetically Induced Currents: Present Knowledge and Future Research", 
IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 9, No.1, pp. 50-58, January 1994. 
The paper that provides a review of GICs in power systems. It then calculates the electric and 
magnetic field in a layered earth for Quebec during the March 1989, magnetic disturbance. 
27. Pirjola, R., "Induction in Power Transmission Lines During Geomagnetic Disturbances", Space 
Science Review, No. 35, pp 185-193, 1983. 
The paper elaborates about the calculation of the electric field. It also considers measurements of 
GICs at 4 different substations. 
28. Kappenman, lG., Albertson, V.D., and Mohan, N., "Current Transformer and Relay Performance 
in the Presence of Geomagnetically-Induced Currents", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus 
and Systems, Vol. PAS-100, No.3, pp. 1078-lO88, March 1981. 
Extensive discussion ofCT modelling and simulations including saturation characteristics. 










29. Albertson, V.D., "Electric and Magnetic Field at the Earth's Surface Due to Auroral Currents", 
IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-89, No.4, pp. 578-584, April 
1970. 
The paper considers the calculation of the electric and magnetic field at the surface of the earth. 
30. Kappenman, J.G., et aI., "GIC Mitigation: A Neutral Blocking I Bypass Device to prevent the 
flow ofGIC in Power Systems", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 6, No.3, pp. 1271-
1281, July 1991. 
The paper discusses the possibility and performance of a capacitor in a transformer neutral as a 
blocking device for GIC 
31. Boteler, D.H., Pirjola, RJ., Nevanlinna, H., "The Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on 
Electrical Systems at the Earth's Surface", Adv. Sapce Res., Vol. 22, No.1, pp 17-27, 1998. 
The paper discusses the occurrence of geomagnetic storms, which is followed by an explanation of the 
susceptibility of a power system to the effects of such a storm. 
32. Makinen, T., "Geomagnetically Induced Currents in the Finnish Power Transmission System", 
Finnish Meteorological Institute, No. 32, p26, 1993. 
A very good paper on the prediction of GICs in the Finnish Power Grid based on measurements and 
theoretical models. 
33. Cigre, "Guide on EMC in Power Plants and Substations", Working Group 36.04, pp. 40-42, 
December 1997. 
A short general overview ofGICs and their effects. 
34. Molinski, T.S., "Why Utilities Respect GICs", XXVlth General Assembly International Union of 
Radio Science, August 1999. 
A very good paper giving a general overview and covering almost all aspects of GICs. 
35. Technology Group Research Proposal, "EskomlEPRI Sunburst 200 Collaboration: Geomagnetic 
Currents in Eskom's Southern Cape 400kV Network", Eskom, Report No TRRlCONS9/1998, 
1998. 
The initial research proposal by Eskom used to approve the project. The proposal outlines the 
ultimate objectives of the research. 
36. Viljanen, A., Pirjola, R., "Statistics on Geomagnetically-Induced Currents in the Finnish 400kV 
Power System Based on Recordings of Geomagnetic Variations", Journal on Geomagnetism and 
Geoelectricity, Vol. 41, pp 411-420, 1989. 
A description of the Finnish system and the development of the earth surface potential. 










37. Girgis, R.S., Ko, C., "Calculation techniques and Results of GIC Currents as Applied to Two 
Large Power Transfonners", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 7, No.2, pp. 669-705, 
April 1992. 
A good description and analysis on the effect and mechanism ofGICs inside transformers. 
38. Electric Research and Management, Inc., "SUNBURST GIC Network - Phase II Progress 
Report", Prepared for Electric Power Research Institute, February 1997. 
The report presents the progress of the Sunburst Network as well as technical discussions on the effect 
ofGICs. 
39. Calabro, S., Coppadoro, F., Crepaz, S., "The measurement of the magnetisation characteristics of 
large power transfonners and reactors through D.C. excitation", IEEE Transactions on Power 
Delivery, Vol. 1, No.4, pp. 224- 234, October 1986. 
The paper discusses the non-linear magnetisation characteristics though dc excitation of both 
transformers and reactors. 
40. Aspnes, J.D., Merritt R.P., Spell, B.D., "Instrumentation Systems to Measure geomagnetic ally 
Induced Current Effect" IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 2, No.4, pp. 1031 - 1036, 
April 1989. 
The paper describes an instrumentation system that was used to measure the effects of GIC to the 
Alaska intertie. 
41. Pirjola, R., "On Currents Induced in Power Transmission Systems During Geomagnetic 
Variations", IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-104, No. 10, pp. 
2825-2831, October 1985. 
The discussion concerns the calculation of the horizontal electric field and earth surface potential 
linking it to the varying geomagnetic fields from the electro jet. 
42. Pirjola, R., "Modelling the electric and magnetic fields at the Earth's surface due to an auroral 
electrojet", Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics, No. 60, pp 1139-1148, 1998. 
The paper compares two models to calculate the electric and magnetic fields from the electro jet. The 
one model concerns the electro jet to be of infinite length and for the other model it has a finite length. 
43. Petschek, H., Feero, W., "Electric Power and Space Weather", Geomagnetic Applications 
Bulletin, pp 5 & 7, January 1997. 
A short article that serves to inform the reader ofGICs, its effects and preventative steps. 
44. Appell, D., "Fire in the Sky", New Scientist, pp 29-32,27 February 1999. 
A scientific report informing the reader of the source ofGICs, its effects and modelling of the currents 
and electrojets. 












TRIP TO UNITED STATES AND SCANDINAVIA 
BY 
JACKO KOEN 
27 September 1999 to 19 October 1999 
The purpose of the visit was to hold technical discussions and undertake work with 
various researchers and Power Company Authorities on Geomagnetically Induced 
Currents (GICs) in power systems. The phenomenon and its possible effects on the 
Eskom MTS is not well understood and it was necessary to visit other researchers and 
utilities to strengthen the research being done by Eskom. 
2 Itinerary 
Date Location Reason 
Travel to Washington DC from Cape Town 
29/09/99 Washington DC, USA Attend Sunburst 2000 annual 
meeting 
30109/99 Washington DC, USA Attend Sunburst 2000 annual 
meeting 
Travel to Pittsburgh from Washington DC 
4/10199 Pittsburgh, USA Attend Sunburst Workshop 
5/10/99 Pittsburgh, USA Attend Sunburst Workshop 
Travel back to Washington DC and from there to Helsinki 
11/10/99 Helsinki, Finland Visit Finnish Meteorological 
Institute 
12/10/99 Helsinki, Finland Visit Finnish Meteorological 
Institute 
13/10/99 Helsinki, Finland Visit Finnish Meteorological 
Institute 
14/10/99 Helsinki, Finland Visit Fingrid Company 
15/10/99 Helsinki, Finland Visit Finnish Meteorological 
Institute 
Travel to Stockholm from Helsinki 
18/10/99 Stockholm, Sweden Visit to Swedish National 
Grid 











3 United States. 
3.1 Washington D.C.: Attending the Sunburst 2000 Annual Meeting 
The purpose of this trip was as follows: 
To attend the EPRI Sunburst 2000 Review Meeting in Washington, DC. As part of the 
approved TRI research project it was anticipated to take part in the EPRI Sunburst 
2000 survey of GICs in large transmission systems world-wide. Since this participation 
is currently being reassessed, it served to investigate the technical and financial 
benefits of the proposed collaboration. 
A major part of the meeting was a presentation and discussion of the SUNBURST-2000 
project including progress made as well as a practical demonstration to illustrate the 
effectiveness of the hardware and software. 
Some presentations at the meeting included: 
• Strategy for Managing the Impact of GIC on the NGC Transmission System - Arslan 
Erinmez, NGC 
• SpaceCast I PowerCast (a proposed mitigation technique by a warning in advance 
of a storm) - John Kappenman, Metatech 
• Fingrid Transformer Test Plans and Update on the Complex Image Method - Risto 
Pirjola, Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) 
• Space Weather Predictions I Forecasting - Brian Anderson and Dimitris Vassiliadis, 
NASA 
3.2 Pittsburgh: Attending the Sunburst 2000 Workshop 
The 2 day workshop served as an introduction to the Sunburst-2000 hardware and 
software. The workshop was presented by George Batrus of Electric Research. This 
company supplies and calibrates all the equipment needed to effectively measure GICs 
and its effects. Attending the workshop was successful from a financial perspective 
since the installation of the measuring equipment can now be done by the author, 
saving the costs of it being done by Electric Research. 
3.3 Summary of visit to the USA 
The trip was very successful in giving an insight into the progress and to receive up to 
date information as preparation for the occurrence of GICs. I found it surprising that 
many utilities who are very familiar with the effects of GICs are unprepared and ignoring 
the problem. I can only attribute this attitude to the fact that GICs occur mainly in 11 
year cycles, causing a false comfort. 
Although participating in the Sunburst 2000 program is quite costly this amount is 
minute compared to the possible financial implications due to GICs. Through 
partiCipation one can accurately assess possible perturbations and then decide whether 













4.1.1 Helsinki: Visit to the Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI) 
The purpose of this visit was to develop and test geomagnetic and engineering models 
of the Eskom grid. The author met with Prof. Risto Pirjola and Dr Ari Viljanen of the 
FMI. The FMI has been carrying out research of GIGs, including their effects on power 
network equipment as well as measurements in transformer neutrals for more than 20 
years. The FMI has also been participating in the EPRI SUNBURST project since 
1994. 
Geological, geomagnetic and engineering data from South Africa was discussed. It 
was decided to use the plane wave method assuming a homogenous earth to model 
the geoelectric field. A method to model autotransformers in the engineering step was 
also discussed. Two software programs for the geomagnetic and engineering models, 
based on the FMI models, were developed by the author and will be used for the 
Eskom grid. 
4.1.2 Helsinki: Visit to the Fingrid Power Company 
The author met with Mr Jarmo Elovaara of the Fingrid company. The company is 
responsible for the Finnish Transmission Lines. Their small personnel of 270 are 
responsible to manage the grid comprising of 100 substations and 14'000 km of 
transmission lines. They have experienced large GIGs in their power network 
equipment and work closely with the FMI. One of their current projects is to asses the 
performance of a 3 phase, 5 limb transformer in the presence of GIGs by injecting dc 
current into the neutral. 
Although the company has measured very large GIGs in the transformer neutrals they 
have not had severe incidents due to GIGs. It has not caused any power system 
disturbances nor any equipment failure. However, there is clear evidence of 
transformer saturation due to GIGs because of the increase in harmonic content in line 
currents' as well as irregular fluctuations of reactive power. They believe that the 
excellent behaviour of the system during a geomagnetic storm is due to their 
transformer design where a lot of emphasis is put on the prevention of leakage flux. 
Another contributing factor is that almost all their transformers are used at less than 
50% of rated load. They have identified the "hot spots" on their network and 













4.2.1 Stockholm: Visit to the Svenska Kraftnat 
The author met with Mr Berti! Kielen and Mr Lars Wallin of the Swedish National Grid. 
The company, who employs a staff of 235 people, is responsible for the transmission 
grid in Sweden. They have in the past experienced relay trips due to GICs; most of this 
is blamed on the old electromechanical overcurrent relays used at that time. These 
relays did not have any stabilisation against the 100Hz harmonic. Another factor which 
decreased the networks susceptibility to GICs is that they use series capacitors in most 
of their longer lines, effectively blocking the quasi-dc GICs. 
At this time only one site is being monitored. It is a generator step-up transformer at a 
nuclear power station. Through past events it seems that this site experience the 
highest magnitude of GICs. When the measured value at this site exceeds a certain 
threshold it will set an alarm at the Swedish National Control to make the operators 
aware of a possible problem. They will then be conscious of a possible problem (such 
as increase in MVAR demand, voltage or frequency swing, etc.) and if required 
disconnect the transformer. This system has been in operation following the previous 
cycle and to date such an action has not been necessary, taking in mind that this was 
during a solar minimum period. 
4.3 Summary of visit to Scandinavia 
The visit to the FMI was very successful in understanding the modelling of a power grid 
and to calculate the flow of GICs. Other benefits were the exposure to their established 
experience and guidance concerning the measurement of currents and the effect of the 
currents on the high voltage equipment. 
The researchers at the FMI have been very helpful since the start of this project. Once 
again they went through a lot of trouble to help and give guidance. The visit to the FMI 
has helped to understand and apply some of the essential steps to complete both the 
engineering and geophysical step. .. 
The Fingrid company is very aware of GICs and have measured them for more than 20 
years. However, they have not incorporated any mitigation techniques to date since 
they have not experienced any major disturbances such as the blackout in Canada 
during March 1989. They do not anticipate any problems due to overheating of 
transformers but are aware that the saturation of more than one transformer could 
cause the reactive power demand to cause problems. 
The Swedish National Grid does not seem to be too concerned with GICs. Apart from 
the measurements at a selected site they do not have any other formal mitigation 
techniques. They are satisfied through past experience that it is only necessary to 












Data of Geomagnetic Activity (K"index) for Period 1/01/89 - 31/12/92 
Major to severe storms (i.e. K ~ 6) are indicated in bold 
Year Date K-index 16 February 4423 3123 
1989 1 January 3122 2132 17 February 2222 2011 
2 January 1122 2221 18 February 1210 3431 
3 January 22 1122 19 February 122 2323 
4 January 1033 2234 20 February 2343 3331 
5 January 4443 4552 21 February 2133 2311 
6 January 2223 1123 22 February 1133 2222 
7 January 4233 2321 23 February 1122 2 
8 January 1133 3333 24 February 2223 2111 
9 January 2222 4333 25 February 22 1011 
10 January 2231 3321 26 February 1011 1001 
11 January 1121 4666 27 February 1112 2201 
12 January 4322 2121 28 February 233 3334 
13 January 2 4433 
14 January 3311 2234 1 March 3223 3222 
15 January 3434 4455 2 March 3534 4232 
16. January 3334 3535 3 March 2344 3442 
17 January 3334 5342 4 March 3113 3300 
18 January 4233 3211 5 March 3345 4333 
19 January 2120 122 6 March 3234 6533 
20 January 2134 7754 7 March 3323 2212 
21 January 3233 3444 8 March 2110 465 
22 January 4333 4323 9 March 4422 3334 
23 January 2243 4323 10 March 3332 2222 
24 January 1122 2332 11 March 2233 2234 
25 January 1023 3232 12 March 4223 4543 
26 January 2223 2211 13 March 5679 7889 
27 January 2123 3211 14 March 9765 3466 
28 January 1212 2232 15 March 6443 3332 
29 January 2122 3321 16 March 1445 5343 
30 January 1212 2222 17 March 4343 3322 
31 January 2122 2366 18 March 222 3301 
19 March 1264 5333 
1 February 4324 4235 20 March 1322 3323 
2 February 4320 3344 21 March 4243 2133 
3 February 4534 4454 22 March 3233 4555 
4 February 4322 4244 23 March 3224 3434 
5 February 3223 2334 24 March 4332 1101 
6 February 3232 3332 25 March 1122 233 
7 February 3224 3233 26 March 2213 3224 
8 February 3222 2223 27 March 3253 5634 
9 February 3322 3233 28 March 5336 5434 
10 February 3212 2010 29 March 5444 4366 
11 February 1023 2342 30 March 4553 2244 
12 February 2112 2343 31 March 4543 4444 
13 February 3344 3442 
14 February 2232 3310 1 April 5333 3454 











3 April 4323 2234 27 May 3333 2233 
4 April 4345 5445 28 May 2312 3332 
5 April 5334 3354 29 May 4233 3322 
6 April 4322 2232 30 May 3221 1022 
7 April 1143 4334 31 May 3122 2123 
8 April 4323 3432 
9 April 4223 2342 1 June 3212 2122 
10 April 3011 2132 2 June 1123 4133 
11 April 1222 4432 3 June 3311 3323 
12 April 2121 1112 4 June 4401 1001 
13 April 1243 2223 5 June 1021 112 
14 April 3132 2455 6 June 2222 2104 
15 April 4533 2221 7 June 5445 4023 
16 April 1120 3354 8 June 3222 2044 
17 April 4012 1211 9 June 5423 2255 
18 April 3313 1000 10 June 4444 4544 
19 April 1022 2211 11 June 4333 2222 
20 April 2222 1222 12 June 3232 2110 
21 April 2232 2210 13 June 1022 1333 
22 April 3101 2112 14 June 2345 4344 
23 April 2122 2442 15 June 5443 3433 
24 April 3103 3213 16 June 3322 1000 
25 April 2234 3555 17 June 2 111 
26 April 5554 4454 18 June 1 1110 
27 April 6544 2444 19 June 22 1122 
28 April 4333 3344 20 June 2223 3343 
29 April 2344 3344 21 June 11 1 
30 April 3232 2232 22 June 10 1011 
23 June 1012 1111 
1 May 3112 1223 24 June 1123 3102 
2 May 3333 2243 25 June 1212 1101 
3 May 3222 2123 26 June 22 2222 
4 May 4321 2334 27 June 2101 1002 
5 May 5544 1143 28 June 2112 1101 
6 May 2323 1133 29 June 3322 1222 
7 May 444 4345 30 June 3322 11 
8 May 2011 13 
9 May 1010 2100 1 July 1032 1643 
10 May 1000 2 2 July 3120 0 
11 May 11 122 3 July 11 0 
12 May 2232 1221 4 July 11 1000 
13 May 113 4310 5 July 1002 1233 
14 May 1322 1211 6 July 2212 2221 
15 May 1132 1232 7 July 1121 1010 
16 May 1222 1211 8 July 10 0 
17 May 1222 1111 9 July 2100 1011 
18 May 1222 2210 10 July 1223 1223 
19 May 12 1211 11 July 1001 0 
20 May 1015 4220 12 July 1 1 
21 May 1122 2111 13 July 30 110 
22 May 2122 3223 14 July 0 121 
23 May 2212 5646 15 July 12 1110 
24 May 5454 5544 16 July 0 0 
25 May 4232 2233 17 July 3232 2331 











19 July 1100 0 10 September 2222 2321 
20 July 12 102 11 September 2 2 
21 July 1112 1 12 September 2233 2101 
22 July 1001 2002 13 September 1122 2223 
23 July 1312 3311 14 September 1123 2000 
24 July 2013 2211 15 September 3423 4466 
25 July 1132 2103 16 September 4331 2222 
26 July 1122 2222 17 September 2010 1023 
27 July 2221 213 18 September 3234 3466 
28 July 2112 1123 19 September 5653 3230 
29 July 3123 1223 20 September 101 1111 
30 July 1021 112 21 September 2221 1001 
31 July 1011 1001 22 September 245 4333 
23 September 2010 102 
1 August 1010 1112 24 September 22 2122 
2 August 3110 1 25 September 1100 1111 
3 August 2222 1000 26 September 135 4666 
4 August 12 2122 27 September 3022 2000 
5 August 1000 1 28 September 2100 1222 
6 August 1001 1222 29 September 2112 1322 
7 August 1122 3222 30 September 2202 1354 
8 August 2222 12 
9 August 2012 1143 1 October 2222 2212 
10 August 3355 3344 2 October 1433 3210 
11 August 4424 3312 3 October 1134 3432 
12 August 3122 3102 4 October 2111 1122 
13 August 3321 2111 5 October 2101 1111 
14 August 3366 5335 6 October 1034 2213 
15 August 5543 5336 7 October 3222 2222 
16 August 5522 2123 8 October 2223 1003 
17 August 3222 3544 9 October 3322 2113 
18 August 5444 3343 10 October 3322 2311 
19 August 3411 1120 11 October 2233 2211 
20 August 1244 5411 12 October 1233 2112 
21 August 2111 2445 13 October 1100 0 
22 August 4332 11 14 October 0 1000 
23 August 2323 4544 15 October 201 2130 
24 August 3021 1001 16 October 1123 3121 
25 August 11 1212 17 October 2223 1021 
26 August 122 0 18 October 4324 3333 
27 August 2433 4364 19 October 5444 4120 
28 August 2012 1245 20 October 2335 7775 
29 August 6642 3331 21 October 4567 6566 
30 August 2323 3333 22 October 4423 3444 
31 . August 2010 1222 23 October 3431 2343 
24 October 2243 2333 
1 September 2220 1000 25 October 3332. 1102 
2 September 2222 1210 26 October 2322 4454 
3 September 1321 2012 27 October 4234 3232 
4 September 5444 2003 28 October 1122 1432 
5 September 3353 1021 29 October 1222 2234 
6 September 2222 2321 30 October 3233 2233 
7 September 2023 3533 31 October 3222 4131 
8 September 4432 1212 











2 November 4332 2343 26 December 2133 3354 
3 November 4244 4232 27 December 3323 4433 
4 November 2134 4335 28 December 3322 2213 
5 November 5233 1144 29 December 2244 4555 
6 November 2112 3231 30 December 4232 2334 
7 November 3334 5223 31 December 4334 3434 
8 November 2224 3430 
9 November 4444 3541 
10 November 2343 2322 
11 November 4344 4354 
12 November 3332 2123 
13 November 3444 4554 
14 November 3333 2223 
15 November 2032 2211 
16 November 1012 3221 
17 November 2337 6767 
18 November 6443 2122 
19 November 33 343 
20 November 1113 2232 
21 November 3144 3101 
22 November 111 2321 
23 November 3101 11 
24 November 231 1112 
25 November 2300 0 
26 November 1024 1333 
27 November 2222 3334 
28 November 4443 4435 
29 November 4334 3343 
30 November 3212 4244 
1 December 4323 4565 
2 December 4434 1223 
3 December 4335 3333 
4 December 4433 3335 
5 December 4210 121 
6 December 2100 2111 
7 December 2222 233 
8 December 1122 2012 
9 December 1112 1020 
10 December 10 10 
11 December 122 3211 
12 December 1121 2113 
13 December 2223 2120 
14 December 13 4332 
15 December 2123 2222 
16 December 1124 3323 
17 December 2224 3211 
18 December 1033 2133 
19 December 3212 3021 
20 December 1222 2222 
21 December 3222 2221 
22 December 3344 5463 
23 December 3434 3222 
24 December 2223 3443 











Year Date K-index 24 February 4223 3334 
1990 2 January 4124 3224 25 February 3334 3343 
3 January 3222 1331 26 February 3223 2033 
4 January 2013 2223 27 February 4335 3232 
5 January 3122 2343 28 February 3433 4242 
6 January 2111 2111 
7 January 2121 1001 1 March 4323 3334 
8 January 1112 4543 2 March 2233 2233 
9 January 3232 3212 3 March 2222 3232 
10 January 3233 2333 4 March 22 1012 
11 January 2234 4343 5 March 3212 1103 
12 January 3224 3232 6 March 4443 3211 
13 January 2123 2101 7 March 2223 3202 
14 January 12 3211 8 March 2113 3211 
15 January 1111 2310 9 March 2124 2112 
16 January 1133 1233 10 March 1122 3121 
17 January 2221 1212 11 March 3233 2321 
18 January 2013 3112 12 March 2233 3566 
19 January 1001 1022 13 March 6423 2234 
20 January 3243 3332 14 March 5335 3321 
21 January 3334 4342 15 March 3112 1133 
22 January 3324 3233 16 March 3122 1022 
23 January 3423 3333 17 March 1021 0 
24 January 3443 3344 18 March 1134 4455 
25 January 4333 2211 19 March 5212 1112 
26 January 2123 2330 20 March 3223 3336 
27 January 1110 210 21 March 6345 4453 
28 January 22 3334 22 March 4233 3344 
29 January 4342 4233 23 March 3333 3343 
30 January 4432 4443 24 March 3323 3244 
31 January 3333 3331 25 March 3334 4344 
26 March 5333 3443 
1 February 2123 4453 27 March 4443 2355 
2 February 3333 4443 28 March 3323 3233 
3 February 2102 1332 29 March 3313 3325 
4 February 3323 3663 30 March 3365 4322 
5 February 3333 2331 31 March 2111 1012 
6 February 2221 1111 
7 February 223 3445 1 April 2000 1022 
8 February 2220 10 2 April 223 3222 
9 February 22 3211 3 April 1223 4333 
10 February 1032 3211 4 April 3123 3220 
11 February 1232 3222 5 April ,23 4220 
12 February 3123 1000 6 April 123 2112 
13 February 102 1313 7 April 1133 2211 
14 February 4445 3211 8 April 2102 2111 
15 February 2244 4456 9 April 1145 4432 
16 February 5533 2334 10 April 3346 7675 
17 February 5323 3334 11 April 5433 3442 
18 February 3234 3334 12 April 3664 5554 
19 February 4334 4445 13 April 5343 3444 
20 February 4443 5354 14 April 4444 3334 
21 February 2323 2232 15 April 3432 3231 
22 February 2223 3354 16 April 2121 2022 











18 April 4433 3213 10 June 4222 3214 
19 April 2121 1233 11 June 3212 2123 
20 April 2123 2244 12 June 4335 3566 
21 April 4432 1001 13 June 6554 5432 
22 April 2332 1324 14 June 4535 6433 
23 April 3444 3433 15 June 2322 1113 
24 April 2243 3223 16 June 3000 0 
25 April 3333 2223 17 June 10 0 
26 April 3421 1101 18 June 23 2333 
27 April 2432 1224 19 June 2210 1000 
28 April 3233 3243 20 June 0 1 
29 April 3344 2234 21 June 1 21 
30 April 6323 1113 22 June 2210 1 
23 June 1011 1200 
1 May 2212 2120 24 June 12 1111 
2 May 124 2112 25 June 1122 2011 
3 May 2214 3233 26 June 1112 1101 
4 May 3123 3322 27 June 1022 2113 
5 May 2123 1130 28 June 2122 1100 
6 May 121 1011 29 June 121 2110 
7 May 1021 1200 30 June 1000 1 
8 May 1222 2213 
9 May 2233 3134 1 July 1000 13 
10 May 3444 3342 2 July 3310 0 
11 May 4333 3223 3 July 1211 1000 
12 May 4101 1 4 July 1022 322 
13 May 112 3322 5 July 1202 1122 
14 May 110 10 6 July 1001 21 
15 May 1002 3010 7 July 10 13 
16 May 10 1000 8 July 312 1213 
17 May 112 0 9 July 2111 2100 
18 May 2143 4434 10 July 323 3111 
19 May 4422 4324 11 July 120 1030 
20 May 2323 3343 12 July 1132 1003 
21 May 3203 4433 13 July 2333 123 
22 May 3344 4333 14 July 2021 2232 
23 May 3122 212 15 July 2321 120 
24 May 0 101 16 July 3100 1021 
25 May 3223 3323 17 July 100 3 
26 May 4313 4346 18 July 2020 1120 
27 May 3554 3422 19 July 1223 3223 
28 May 112 1211 20 July 2233 2222 
29 May 1022 2214 21 July 2010 21 
30 May 3324 3243 22 July 1110 1001 
31 May 3212 1132 23 July 1100 11 
24 July 102 0 
1 June 1212 2121 25 July 1012 1000 
2 June 1011 1100 26 July 11 1132 
3 June 1111 1011 27 July 1222 1021 
4 June 101 0 28 July 2456 6566 
5 June 1 1011 29 July 5544 4324 
6 June 2222 1223 30 July 2222 123 
7 June 3333 2122 31 July 3021 0 
8 June 2423 134 











2 August 3221 2 25 September 4322 43 
3 August 2122 2033 26 September 2123 2221 
4 August 3120 2010 27 September 3211 2111 
5 August 1001 1102 28 September 2212 2112 
6 August 2112 1232 29 September 2112 2012 
7 August 1112 1102 30 September 2101 1011 
8 August 1220 0 
9 August 2001 100 1 October 1111 1 
10 August 111 111 2 October 1011 2221 
11 August 3132 2001 3 October 2222 2223 
12 August 2212 2 4 October 1233 3332 
13 August 2323 2221 5 October 2233 3212 
14 August 2244 2223 6 October 2233 2222 
15 August 2114 3334 7 October 1122 2233 
16 August 3244 3324 8 October 11 2111 
17 August 4331 1332 9 October 1012 4543 
18 August 2322 2202 10 October 5464 4222 
19 August 4321 3113 11 October 5254 5345 
20 August 2432 2230 12 October 3433 2333 
21 August 2123 3354 13 October 3222 2233 
22 August 3443 3324 14 October 3232 2334 
23 August 4333 4543 15 October 3323 3343 
24 August 3443 3200 16 October 2122 1233 
25 August 1010 122 17 October 1111 1001 
26 August 2355 5433 18 October 1 1121 
27 August 4332 4221 19 October 3223 1123 
28 August 2122 2100 20 October 1233 5534 
29 August 1123 2142 21 October 3232 2010 
30 August 3223 4433 22 October 3332 2111 
31 August 4223 2111 23 October 1122 2233 
24 October 4434 4131 
1 September 2314 4431 25 October 3212 2112 
2 September 1 0 26 October 2014 3432 
3 September 11 10 27 October 1202 1111 
4 September 1012 1323 28 October 1132 0 
5 September 4222 2112 29 October 103 3243 
6 September 3143 2221 30 October 5222 2233 
7 September 3233 3211 31 October 1232 3453 
8 September 1122 133 
9 September 1212 1123 1 November 1222 1213 
10 September 3120 123 2 November 2321 1123 
11 September 2244 3345 3 November 1213 2111 
12 September 3333 2143 4 November 1011 0 
13 September 4133 3323 5 November 0 1 
14 September 4334 3332 6 November 113 11 
15 September 3334 4331 7 November 22 2221 
16 September 4345 4212 8 November 22 2222 
17 September 2232 1123 9 November 2232 2112 
18 September 123 2243 10 November 2123 2122 
19 September 4223 1423 11 November 1133 3121 
20 September 4101 1345 12 November 2302 1112 
21 September 3123 2223 13 November 1121 110 
22 September 3332 2233 14 November 1 1000 
23 September 3333 1221 15 November 1012 121 











17 November 1233 3432 
18 November 4302 3332 
19 November 3322 1212 
20 November 2212 2122 
21 November 2212 3121 
22 November 21 1020 
23 November 111 1101 
24 November 1000 1000 
25 November 1022 1111 
26 November 2132 3004 
27 November 4234 5653 
28 November 3322 2241 
29 November 1111 121 
30 November 1012 2421 
1 December 1100 1001 
2 December 112 2221 
3 December 11 1233 
4 December 3322 3323 
5 December 2122 2331 
6 December 1122 2111 
7 December 1111 1210 
8 December 12 3432 
9 December 2222 2220 
10 December 23 10 
11 December 11 200 
12 December 11 1233 
13 December 3334 2121 
14 December 2121 2110 
15 December 111 1111 
16 December 1012 2222 
17 December 2322 1120 
18 December 2002 1100 
19 December 10 1000 
20 December 1001 2231 
21 December 1 1111 
22 December 113 3003 
23 December 43 1213 
24 December 2233 3333 
25 December 2323 3221 
26 December 1022 2000 
27 December 2311 2110 
28 December 1211 1111 
29 December 1100 110 
30 December 1334 3332 











Year Date K-index 23 February 2233 3432 
1991 1 January 3112 1001 24 February 1210 21 
2 January 1121 1011 25 February 1123 2221 
3 January 1212 3112 26 February 1133 2201 
4 January 2220 12 27 February 23 2122 
5 January 2212 3121 28 February 3233 3223 
6 January 1112 1000 
7 January 1000 1 1 March 3233 2134 
8 January 2122 3221 2 March 2223 2122 
9 January 112 1022 3 March 2021 22 
10 January 2122 2213 4 March 1001 1332 
11 January 22 2221 5 March 3244 3423 
12 January 4253 2422 6 March 2243 3354 
13 January 2211 2130 7 March 3323 3444 
14 January 1111 0 8 March 3234 3324 
15 January 2122 3133 9 March 4434 4325 
16 January 1022 3112 10 March 4422 3010 
17 January 2114 3322 11 March 12 2001 
18 January 1221 2323 12 March 2233 3234 
19 January 101 10 13 March 6443 2310 
20 January 2 110 14 March 1033 1000 
21 January 111 2 15 March 1013 3100 
22 January 2211 1011 16 March 1 352 
23 January 122 1023 17 March 2224 2133 
24 January 3234 3443 18 March 3333 0 
25 January 3333 3443 19 March 112 2333 
26 January 2333 3113 20 March 3333 2121 
27 January 23 3223 21 March 1144 5432 
28 January 122 3111 22 March 2343 3224 
29 January 1112 1211 23 March 4323 3211 
30 January 100 1322 24 March 2866 5378 
31 January 3244 2333 25 March 6643 4555 
26 March 6555 7443 
1 February 3233 2355 27 March 4543 3444 
2 February 5321 1001 28 March 4323 2331 
3 February 111 1101 29 March 121 102 
4 February 1 1013 30 March 1332 3334 
5 February 2132 2232 31 March 3222 12 
6 February 122 1021 
7 February 1212 2223 1 April 4444 4334 
8 February 2223 2322 2 April 4334 2334 
9 February 4113 2443 3 April 4354 3344 
10 February 3112 1111 4 April 3236 6443 
11 February 3222 1323 5 April 3232 2111 
12 February 4333 3212 6 April 3323 1332 
13 February 2204 3222 7 April 2323 2122 
14 February 1102 2323 8 April 2011 1022 
15 February 3012 2022 9 April 3222 1232 
16 February 10 0 10 April 1122 2101 
17 February 10 1000 11 April 1012 1110 
18 February 11 11 12 April 1233 3211 
19 February 2 4420 13 April 122 1110 
20 February 1011 1243 14 April 1123 2121 
21 February 2223 1210 15 April 1023 2100 











17 April 1223 3331 9 June 6334 3553 
18 April 1134 2132 10 June 4356 5456 
19 April 1344 1011 11 June 6544 4344 
20 April 11 1000 12 June 4324 4444 
21 April 1113 2111 13 June 6566 6574 
22 April 1023 2110 14 June 4321 1000 
23 April 3 2322 15 June 1243 2310 
24 April 2122 2034 16 June 1 1 
25 April 4334 2012 17 June 2214 5566 
26 April 3331 1113 18 June 3432 1243 
27 April 3433 3234 19 June 3444 3434 
28 April 4443 4344 20 June 4323 1132 
29 April 6444 4454 21 June 5233 2333 
30 April 4433 3232 22 June 3322 2223 
23 June 3335 4345 
1 May 4233 4434 24 June 5433 3233 
2 May 4443 4433 25 June 4324 2234 
3 May 2323 2123 26 June 4223 3333 
4 May 3110 1112 27 June 3112 113 
5 May 2110 110 28 June 2321 11 
6 May 110 1003 29 June 0 1011 
7 May 1133 1000 30 June 3323 2445 
8 May 2033 1220 
9 May 2122 2233 1 July 3320 2232 
10 May 1133 2202 2 July 133 3234 
11 May 1012 100 3 July 3234 3233 
12 May 2 20 4 July 4222 2211 
13 May 135 3343 5 July 11 1100 
14 May 245 3433 6 July 1012 1222 
15 May 1232 2000 7 July 1200 1123 
16 May 1001 2143 8 July 3233 3565 
17 May 4343 3310 9 July 2376 5555 
18 May 0 0 10 July 4323 3110 
19 May 1101 11 11 July 3234 3212 
20 May 11 1000 12 July 2235 3332 
21 May 2 3210 13 July 4456 5755 
22 May 3233 2122 14 July 5555 4333 
23 May 3334 4323 15 July 3322 1011 
24 May 3233 4344 16 July 2222 333 
25 May 4423 2433 17 July 4443 3334 
26 May 2243 3444 18 July 3212 2244 
27 May 4334 4234 19 July 4434 4354 
28 May 4333 3344 20 July 3443 3333 
29 May 4333 3143 21 July 3433 3234 
30 May 3133 2323 22 July 3333 3224 
31 May 2134 5432 23 July 4222 3330 
24 July 1012 212 
1 June 3355 5513 25 July 1122 2221 
2 June 4333 3546 26 July 100 1 
3 June 1031 144 27 July 1001 123 
4 June 1023 5655 28 July 1220 2 
5 June 5767 5766 29 July 1120 2 
6 June 5554 2104 30 July 2231 1020 
7 June 2244 2233 31 July 1020 2002 











1 August 3222 2544 24 September 2112 1122 
2 August 4354 4424 25 September 2323 4555 
3 August 4233 3434 26 September 4443 3443 
4 August 4443 2343 27 September 4434 5543 
5 August 3433 3234 28 September 4434 3344 
6 August 5334 3222 29 September 3222 3434 
7 August 2442 1103 30 September 2333 3343 
8 August 3222 2102 
9 August 2322 3222 1 October 3232 3266 
10 August 1131 1201 2 October 5434 4432 
11 August 4334 3311 3 October 2333 2133 
12 August 3334 5455 4 October 2332 4254 
13 August 4122 1011 5 October 5233 2321 
14 August 21 1435 6 October 2113 3534 
15 August 3544 3334 7 October 4433 4232 
16 August 4432 2223 8 October 3243 3463 
17 August 2333 3233 9 October 3423 2212 
18 August 3222 2254 10 October 3333 3332 
19 August 4375 4322 11 October 2223 1222 
20 August 2157 6344 12 October 2112 12 
21 August 5455 3222 13 October 1112 2011 
22 August 4544 2223 14 October 2111 2132 
23 August 3323 1011 15 October 2221 1121 
24 August 3220 2122 16 October 2211 1111 
25 August 2223 1012 17 October 1122 4222 
26 August 1223 2121 18 October 4323 3322 
27 August 3321 1554 19 October 2223 2223 
28 August 3221 2233 20 October 3235 4332 
29 August 123 2323 21 October 2213 3243 
30 August 1223 4354 22 October 3334 3332 
31 August 2254 3334 23 October 2232 1335 
24 October 4343 4333 
1 September 5422 3355 25 October 5333 4335 
2 September 3343 3212 26 October 3243 3334 
3 September 322 1224 27 October 5534 3444 
4 September 2232 2213 28 October 3446 6844 
5 September 3332 2232 29 October 5664 4664 
6 September 2312 2323 30 October 2123 4544 
7 September 3222 2111 31 October 4255 3446 
8 September 2222 3453 
9 September 3334 4346 1 November 5346 6776 
10 September 5543 3334 2 November 6541 2333 
11 September 4224 3232 3 November 2224 3233 
12 September 2233 1212 4 November 2334 2355 
13 September 2122 1133 5 November 5333 3332 
14 September 4334 4433 6 November 2332 2323 
15 September 3221 1122 7 November 3322 1222 
16 September 1122 1022 8 November 2255 7679 
17 September 2110 1001 9 November 7667 5544 
18 September 111 1012 10 November 3244 4333 
19 September 3213 3113 11 November 3223 3455 
20 September 1311 1 12 November 3231 12 
21 September 2002 1001 13 November 1123 4423 
22 September 1012 2201 14 November 4322 4224 











16 November 4234 3333 
17 November 3334 3332 
18 November 3333 3343 
19 November 5344 4654 
20 November 1232 2444 
21 November 2344 4756 
22 November 4435 5223 
23 November 3344 3333 
24 November 2221 2332 
25 November 1231 1322 
26 November 1312 2210 
27 November 1011 222 
28 November 1012 2234 
29 November 3311 3223 
30 November 2222 2224 
1 December 2222 2223 
2 December 3323 5333 
3 December 2223 3233 
4 December 3222 2233 
5 December 2201 1221 
6 December 2102 1001 
7 December 1111 1122 
8 December 1032 3311 
9 December 1234 2333 
10 December 3222 2333 
11 December 3332 2334 
12 December 3322 2334 
13 December 3233 3333 
14 December 1122 2443 
15 December 3212 2000 
16 December 112 4543 
17 December 4344 4343 
18 December 2233 3230 
19 December 1034 3321 
20 December 222 3332 
21 December 3344 3313 
22 December 2132 112 
23 December 2232 1122 
24 December 2323 2110 
25 December 22 2222 
26 December 1222 2233 
27 December 5334 4554 
28 December 3113 4344 
29 December 5433 4445 
30 December 4333 4233 











Year Date K-index 23 February 2332 1225 
1992 1 January 3122 2224 24 February 3133 3556 
2 January 5435 3331 25 February 5644 4244 
3 January 3213 2124 26 February 3343 4676 
4 January 3233 2133 27 February 6467 3553 
5 January 3222 2432 28 February 2222 2012 
6 January 2221 3333 29 February 2215 5543 
7 January 2202 2232 
8 January 3233 3232 1 March 2323 2223 
9 January 2200 2123 2 March 1232 3221 
10 January 3223 2223 3 March 2222 1221 
11 January 2213 3343 4 March 1133 3432 
12 January 3245 4442 5 March 1231 2332 
13 January 3333 3433 6 March 3131 1011 
14 January 3333 4434 7 March 1122 2324 
15 January 3233 4331 8 March 2223 3122 
16 January 1233 4344 9 March 3335 3442 
17 January 2222 2122 10 March 2333 2244 
18 January 1122 100 11 March 3344 4331 
19 January 1221 1201 12 March 2233 2110 
20 January 2223 3222 13 March 122 1000 
21 January 1000 2223 14 March 1 111 
22 January 2122 2010 15 March 1133 2332 
23 January 22 1021 16 March 1123 4342 
24 January 1002 103 17 March 2015 4344 
25 January 2101 1001 18 March 4343 3211 
26 January 1 4423 19 March 0 201 
27 January 4434 2234 20 March 1011 111 
28 January 2322 3332 21 March 2244 5554 
29 January 2232 3244 22 March 4312 2043 
30 January 3323 3333 23 March 4434 2244 
31 January 2232 2131 24 March 3423 3345 
25 March 4323 2211 
1 February 2234 5645 26 March 1224 3242 
2 February 3536 5466 27 March 2110 1143 
3 February 4565 6566 28 March 3122 1123 
4 February 3343 3355 29 March 3222 3342 
5 February 3112 2001 30 March 1311 2133 
6 February 122 2112 31 March 4213 2333 
7 February 2234 3211 
8 February 3342 5745 1 April 2323 2122 
9 February 6565 3445 2 April 1121 331 
10 February 3423 4432 3 April 1~44 4542 
11 February 2222 2322 4 April 1233 3322 
12 February 3222 2303 5 April 2134 4224 
13 February 3234 2011 6 April 3453 3311 
14 February 133 3321 7 April 2343 3221 
15 February 122 2100 8 April 3332 2241 
16 February 1012 1111 9 April 1111 2112 
17 February 1245 6322 10 April 1111 1110 
18 February 3322 2312 11 April 1100 0 
19 February 3233 3222 12 April 1111 1200 
20 February 5544 5565 13 April 132 1011 
21 February 6575 5333 14 April 21 122 











16 April 1111 1200 8 June 5343 3446 
17 April 0 202 9 June 4243 1122 
18 April 2223 4323 10 June 1334 3322 
19 April 4232 2334 11 June 2312 2255 
20 April 3322 3223 12 June 5243 4422 
21 April 3322 1100 13 June 1210 1133 
22 April 3223 2233 14 June 2011 112 
23 April 2010 1322 15 June 3320 2221 
24 April 3333 2332 16 June 1101 1000 
25 April 2233 2113 17 June 110 110 
26 April 1022 1032 18 June 1111 3365 
27 April 2010 1132 19 June 3112 1231 
28 April 2123 2122 20 June 1211 2101 
29 April 2120 122 21 June 3100 102 
30 April 2123 3101 22 June 3202 2111 
23 June 2311 1233 
1 May 1132 2342 24 June 2333 2332 
2 May 3231 1111 25 June 4222 2222 
3 May 2112 2222 26 June 1021 2113 
4 May 2412 2201 27 June 1012 2122 
5 May 202 111 28 June 1244 2212 
6 May 11 1112 29 June 3432 2444 
7 May 2232 3243 30 June 4443 2203 
8 May 1233 4444 
9 May 3302 3465 1 July 3322 2243 
10 May 4477 6666 2 July 2432 2002 
11 May 6532 4443 3 July 2100 0 
12 May 4421 1223 4 July 1 11 
13 May 3423 3113 5 July 2202 2012 
14 May 1101 0 6 July 1001 1000 
15 May 11 1000 7 July 10 101 
16 May 1 0 8 July 0 1001 
17 May 11 11 9 July 1101 1101 
18 May 1011 135 10 July 1210 10 
19 May 4311 1221 11 July 1010 0 
20 May 3112 2113 12 July 2222 3122 
21 May 2021 23 13 July 1343 2333 
22 May 1444 5442 14 July 3323 1231 
23 May 2231 2351 15 July 2201 0 
24 May 3321 1001 16 July 23 2231 
25 May 3132 2221 17 July 2100 1200 
26 May 12 2123 18 July 101 1 
27 May 1132 2211 19 July 1020 11 
28 May 2133 2222 20 July 2201 2222 
29 May 2231 3332 21 July 122 2332 
30 May 1121 3222 22 July 2133 3253 
31 May 3210 200 23 July 3433 2132 
24 July 2012 2211 
1 June 3321 1000 25 July 2012 2332 
2 June 1000 112 26 July 1001 0 
3 June 1121 110 27 July 2 13 
4 June 0 1012 28 July 3432 1123 
5 June 1012 2211 29 July 0 1002 
6 June 21 100 30 July 3101 2032 











23 September 1213 121 
1 August 3212 1011 24 September 0 11 
2 August 2 1121 25 September 2123 2233 
3 August 11 1100 26 September 3200 1310 
4 August 3101 3444 27 September 12 2001 
5 August 4444 3123 28 September 22 3334 
6 August 333 2222 29 September 3553 4434 
7 August 4334 4222 30 September 3333 4444 
8 August 2333 1333 
9 August 3113 2221 1 October 3332 2341 
10 August 2002 1012 2 October 2120 112 
11 August 3122 2323 3 October 10 11 
12 August 2221 0 4 October 2322 2000 
13 August 12 3423 5 October 1111 1212 
14 August 3212 2420 6 October 2212 2111 
15 August 2030 33 7 October 1122 1121 
16 August 1122 1001 8 October 3111 133 
17 August 2101 1 9 October 3336 3343 
18 August 1111 1021 10 October 233 2012 
19 August 111 1122 11 October 1113 4452 
20 August 3544 4211 12 October 3334 5422 
21 August 1212 2441 13 October 3111 3553 
22 August 1234 4455 14 October 3322 2145 
23 August 6762 3132 15 October 5333 3245 
24 August 1123 1233 16 October 5333 2313 
25 August 1201 1001 17 October 2223 3332 
26 August 3233 1022 18 October 2011 1323 
27 August 1223 3232 19 October 4223 3323 
28 August 1200 12 20 October 3332 12 
29 August 4323 2013 21 October 1122 1212 
30 August 1010 2021 22 October 2112 3321 
31 August 101 0 23 October 1121 1002 
24 October 1100 2 
1 September 1001 0 25 October 3122 1122 
2 September 1123 3444 26 October 3233 1233 
3 September 3345 4454 27 October 4333 2432 
4 September 4343 3235 28 October 3222 1222 
5 September 4333 2233 29 October 2333 2454 
6 September 3221 2243 30 October 2222 2323 
7 September 2233 3332 31 October 1022 2211 
8 September 4322 2232 
9 September 4557 5454 1 November 1102 1326 
10 September 5354 5566 2 November 4522 2133 
11 September 6532 1433 3 November 4333 3022 
12 September 3210 11 4 November 2122 3424 
13 September 1100 11 5 November 3233 2121 
14 September 122 1123 6 November 1122 2323 
15 September 2222 2220 7 November 2221 2213 
16 September 1122 2333 8 November 2221 1224 
17 September 4455 4576 9 November 3354 5334 
18 September 4434 3133 10 November 4223 2332 
19 September 3212 2231 11 November 3324 2322 
20 September 1122 2023 12 November 3213 3234 
21 September 1021 24 13 November 2224 4222 











15 November 2122 3434 
16 November 3220 1133 
17 November 2222 1122 
18 November 2012 1330 
19 November 123 2221 
20 November 1001 22 
21 November 3200 11 
22 November 1243 4333 
23 November 3533 4432 
24 November 2232 2332 
25 November 2133 3222 
26 November 2212 3012 
27 November 1111 2100 
28 November 1112 2121 
29 November 1122 3110 
30 November 23 2351 
1 December 3234 3313 
2 December 3212 2222 
3 December 1303 3322 
4 December 1133 3223 
5 December 3211 100 
6 December 1001 1111 
7 December 43 5135 
8 December 4323 3344 
9 December 3223 3323 
10 December 2224 1443 
11 December 2212 1222 
12 December 2211 2122 
13 December 3202 1211 
14 December 2111 2232 
15 December 3223 3133 
16 December 1222 0 
17 December 154 4653 
18 December 3212 1243 
19 December 1212 3244 
20 December 2232 2222 
21 December 1133 3442 
22 December 2122 3211 
23 December 1123 3221 
24 December 212 3231 
25 December 122 1222 
26 December 1001 111 
27 December 10 34 
28 December 3133 4655 
29 December 4333 3522 
30 December 2132 3211 
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S U 11 11 A R Y 
The cause of failure of two 765 kv shunt reactors at Beta Subst 
has been investigated by ESKOM and Toshiba. 
This report co\"ers these invest iga t ions and recommends that all 




















t,;:. \ ,-:>:.-,0 
Reactor No.2 (Blue phase Serial No. 85900082) failed on 
18 April 1991. A Buchholz alarm was received approximatel~ l~ 
hours before failure occurred and the bperator had requested 
National Control permission to switch out the reactor. 
The reactor tripped on Buchholz and tank pressure protection. 
Tests carried out on site indicated failure and the unit was 
brought to Rotek for repair. 
.:::-\ \-"';, ", I 
Reactor l~o. 2 (Red Phase Serial ~~o. 85900002) V,'6S removed from 
~ervice on 23 Septe~ber 1991 approximately 1 hour after a 
Euchholz alarm. Oil testing of hydro carbon ga~es indicated 
o-_'erheatiilg. 
; 2. ADDITIONP..L INFOREATION RECEIVED FROl1 SITE 
According to site measurements no abnormal voltage conditions 
were recorded cn the system prior to the faults ncr at any 
previous occasion. 
It was reported that the neutral earthing reactors on each three 
phase reactor bank had faulted during the past twelve months. 
There were also reoorts of a hioh temperature alarm received o~ 
the Alpha 2 reacto~ on 30 Janua;y 1991. 
3. INSPECTION AT ROTEK 
REACTOR SE. NO. 85900082 
The following observations were made 
3.1 The windings near the tcp of the coil were severely twisted 
and bent. Flash marks were evident on the copper 
conductors. 
3.2 The upper yoke was damaged at two places where overheating 
of the laminations had occurred to the extent that they !lee: 
melted leaving cavities measuring approximately 100 x 50 r.::: 
3.3 The upper shunts controlling the leakage flu~ from the 
winding returning to the yokes showed signs of overheatin~ 













-3.4 At the tips of three upper magnetic shunts on the line side, 
a number of laminations had spread open and bent towards th0 
yoke. They had penetrated the insulation causing electrical 
contact. The yoke laminations had melted at these points. 
3.5 ~olten metal particles from the yoke laminations were found 
between some of the winding conductors. 
3.6 The top ",'ooden clamping ring v.'as bro}:en and shov.'ed signs of 
electrical tra~king. 
3.7 The oil had discoloured. 
3.8 The lower magnetic shunts were slightly discoloured, but 
2ppeared normal. 
REACTOR. SE. NO. 85900002 C \,~ "\ \ 
The followin~ observations were made 
3.9 7here was no apparent damage to the winding. 
3.10 The ~inding insulation was contaminated with carbon 
deposits. 
3.11 The upper yoke was damaged at two places where overheating 
and deterioration of the insulation had occurred. 
3.12 The upper shunts controlling the leakage flux showed signs 
of overheating. 
3.13 At the tips of three upper magnetic shunts on the line side, 
a number of laminations had spread open and bent towards the 
yoke. One shunt on the neutral side had bent in a similar 
manner. They had penetrated the insulation causing 
electrical contact. The yoke laminations had showed signs 
of overheating at these points. 














REACTOR SE. NO. 85900082 
From the available evidence the mode of failure is as follows : 
The shunts collecting the stray flux from the winding situated at -i 
top neutral end of the winding overheated due to a high flux densi~' 
This region also corresponds to the highest oil temperature at the -
top of the winding. This caused the glue bE~ween laminations to f2_ 
allov:ing a number of laminations to bend to\-.'ards the yoke as a resu~ 
of magnetic forces. In the ?rocess they pressed their way through 
the insulation and made electric~l con~ac~ with the yoke. This ir: 
turn set up local circulating currents which overheated and melte~ 
the yoke laminations at the points of contact. Molten m0tal dro?pe( 
onto the windings causing interturn short ci~cuits resulting in tC~i 
v.'inding failure. 
REACTOR SE. NO. 85900002 
A similar process had developed with this re2ctor resulting in yoke 
damage wh0n the shunts bent io make electrical CO:ltact. There was 
evidence of local overheating, but melting had not occurred. Gas fr: 













PART A: TECHNICAL 
1. IT IS RECOMHENDED THAT TOSHIBA'S PROPOSALS FOR REFURBISHl.f.ENT AND 
D1:PROVEl{ENT OF THE EIGHT UNITS ON SITE AT BETA BE IN:PLE}{ENTED 
WITHOUT CHANGES. 
These are applicable to all operating reactors at Beta: 
1.1 Remove reactor to Rotek 
1.2 Untank and remove winding (1st three under Toshiba 
supervision) 
1.3 Execute modifications around upper and lower magnetic shunts 
as per Toshiba improved design. 
1.4 Re-install original lower shunts 
1.5 Install winding 
1.6 I~stall new horizontally-stacked shunts ex Toshiba (original 
design) to replace thermally damaged units. 
1.7 Vapour phase 
1.8 Transport to BBT Pretoria and test as per Toshiba 
recommendations. 
1.9 Transport to Beta and re-install and commission. 
2. SOURCE NEW REACTOR WINDING .Z\.S PER TOSHIBA ORIGINAL DESIGN FRON: 
BBT/PRETORIA OR TOSHIBA/JAPAN AND REPAIR IN:PROVE PROCESS AND TEST 
FIRST FAILED REACTOR AS PER ABOVE. 
a 3. REPAIR SECOND FAILED REACTOR AS PER TOSHIBA RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
IN:PROVE AS ABOVE. 
4. REFILL ALL BETA REACTORS WITH NEW VIRGIN OIL. (8 X 30 KL) 
5. IMPROVE REACTOR COOLING WITH THE ADDITION OF FORCED AIR COOLING 
AS PER TOSHIBA'S RECOl-fl"LENDATION TO REDUCE THE OPERATING 













PART B: OPERATIONAL 
1. Operate the 765 kV system with a nominal target voltage of 
765 kV. 
2. Install protection to avoid overfluy.ing of reactors due temporary 
over voltages (eg 10 minutes @ 1.05 pu of 800 kV) 
3. ~odify the alarm functions of Buchholz relays on all 765 kv 
reactors and transformers to initiate trips and configure the 
tripping logic appropriately to avoid consequential overvoltages 
following such tripping. 
4. Convert BOTH 765 kV lines to 400 kV operation in order to 
facilitate the expeditious modification to all reactors in a 
target time of 12 months (subject to confirmation) without complex 
operating restrictions 
PART C: PURCHASE OF BBT SPARE REACTORS 











PART D: NEGOTIATIONS WITH TOSHIBA 
1. Ratify verbal approval given to Toshiba to proceed with immediate 
manufacture of replacement shunts. 
2. COST SHARING ESKOM/TOSHIBA 
2.1 Negotiate for free delivery of all Toshiba 
repair/replacement/improvement material to Rotek. 
2.2 lJegotiate best price [or::.ne l-epJ acerne:lt v,'inding required for 
repair of first faulted reactor. 
(BBT or Toshiba) 
2.3 Negotiate for free Toshiba quality control on winding if 
supplied by BBT/Pretoria. 
2.4 Negotiate for free supervision of repair/refurbishment of 
first three reactors with training being transferred to 
nominated Rotek personnel. 
2.5 We recommend that Eskom p~y all transport, testing, workshop 
and re-installation and recommissioning costs 
2.6 Negotiate for 50\ sharing of cost for the supply of forced 
air cooling equipment and fittings to Beta site with 
installation and commissioning at Eskom's cost. 
2.7 Risks of equipment damage during refurbishment/repair actions 
to be carried by Eskom. 













PART E: ALPHA SUBSTATION REACTOR PROBLEH 
1. Negotiate with Fuji to obtain technical details of internal 
designs to evaluate gassing problem. 
2. Transport worst case Fuji Reactor to Rotek for inspection in 
January 1992. 
3. Negotiate with Fuji to have designers available at Rotek for 
inspection in February 1992. 
4. Treat other Fuji reactors at Alpha subject to findings. 
PART F: VISIT TO TOSHIBA AND FUJI/JAPN~ 
It is recommended that a combined technical and commercial team be sent 
to Japan in January 1992 for negotiating with Toshiba and conducting 
technical discussions with Fuji. 
PART G: PROJECT EST~LISHMENT 
In view of the importance, magnitude and logistics involved in executing 
the above recommendations (+/- R 15m), it is recommended that a project 
complete with vote and budget be established and a formal Project Leader 
be appointed. 
COSTS AND TIME SCHEDULES 











ESTIMATED COSTS OF REPAIRS FOR SERIAL NO. 85900002 
Dismantle (Beta) 
Trc;nsport Beta Rotek 
Rotek workshop charges 
Rotek labour charges 
Transport (Rotek - BBT) 
BBT Testing 
Transport (BBT - Beta) 
Installation charges 
Filling of new oil (30 kl) 
Recom~issioning charges 
Toshiba Materials 
Toshiba supervision (first 3 units only) 
Supply of cooling fans 
Installation of cooling fans 
] 
) 
Substation Technology Technical SupArvision 


















1 350 000 
II1 












1 ESTIMATED COSTS OF REPAIRS FOR REHAINING IDHTS AT BETA 
1 
ESTIMATED COST PER SINGLE PHASE mHT (FOR EIGHT mnTS) 
Dismantle (Beta) 
Transport Beta - Rotek 
Rotek workshop charges 
Rotek labour charges 
Transport (Rotek - BBT) 
EBT Testing 
Transport (BBT - Beta) 
Installation charges 
Filling of new oil (30 kl) 
Recommissioning charges 
Toshiba Materials 
Toshiba supervision (first 3 units only) 
Supply of cooling fans 
Installation of cooling fans 
) 
] 
Substation Technology Technical Supervision 






































('ORE CLA\lPT)'\(J CO'iSTRVCTTO~ 
DAMAGED UPPER CLAl\1PING 
STRUCTCRE 
".....t---+- SLIGHTLY CARB01\lSED 
-.-tH--tt+t-- SIDE LEG 















-----.-~~,--=~-~ ------ .. 
A P PEN D I X 2 
TEST ITEJ.1 
1. P.EASUREHENT OF HINDING RESISTANCE 
2. KEASUREI·lliNT OF REACTANCE (ABOVE 2000) 
3. DIELECTRIC LOSS P~~GLE (tan 0) TEST (including capacitance) 
4. SEPARATE SOURCE VOLT~GE WITHSTAND TEST ACCORDING TO lEC REDUCED 
VOLTAGE (95 kV x 0.8) 
5. IHPULSE VOLTAGE HITHSTp.~·m TEST 
1950 kv x 0.8 
6. SHITCHING IHPULSE VOLTAGE HITHSTIUm TEST 














UPPER MAGNETTC SHUNT 
1';"EUTRAL SIDE 
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iAPPEND/X 1][ . c .. s -352557 . 
CLAMP CONSTRUCTION 
EXISTING CONSTRUCTION 
tviAGNET!C SHUNT CLAt-.~P 
/ It~ S U L AT ION 
\ CLAMPING BLOCK 
COIL CLAtviPIt~G RING . 
UPPER SIDE 








/ S~PARATING BOARD 
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POINT OF SHUNT CONTACT TO YO;': 
































CALCULATING THE ELECTRIC FIELD 
The following calculation is a simplified example to illustrate the use of the equations in section 4.3. 
This procedure to calculate the electric field has been derived by Viljanen and Pi~ola [68). The 
earth is described as a half-space with a constant conductivity of cr and the geomagnetic field 
propagates as a vertical plane wave in the earth. Using Cartesian co-ordinates, the x-axis is 
directed to the magnetic north, y to the magnetic east and z downwards. The eleCtric field is then 
obtained by 
E(T)= 2 (R -R -JMb ) ... (1) 
N J N-I N N-M 
1r ~()cr~ 
where ~ is the sampling interval, N is the sample number, M = 10 [66) and 
N 
RN = ~)n.JN -n+l ... (2) 
n=N-M+1 
where bn = Bn - Bn-1 (B being the magnetic component). 
Since magnetic and electric fields are perpendicular, Ex will be calculated from By and Ey from Bx. 
This calculation was done to obtain the eastern electric field (Ey) from data on the northern magnetic 
field (Bx) as found in table 2 (none real values are used to simplify the example). 
Table E1 Five samples of northern magnetic field. 
The following assumptions and constants are used: 
N = 5 (sampling number), 
cr = 0.001 (conductivity, i.e. p = 1000 n.m), 
~o = 41t*10-7 (vacuum permeability), 
~ = 10 s (sampling interval), and, 
M = 3 (M=3 to simplify the calculation, normally M = 10). 
Then: 
E(T5) = ~ 2 (R4-R5-..[3b2) 
II.uoO"~ 
b2 = B2 - BI = 20 x 10-9 T 
R4 = ,,4 bn.J 4 - n + 1 .LJn=4-3+1 
R4 = b2..[3 + b3 J2 + b4.J1 = 2.215 X 10-9 
similary R5 = -7.819x 10-9 
5 
330 












Magnetic Data Used for Example in Chapter 4 
Sample Bx [nT] dBx/dt Ey By [nT] dByldt Ex Ig1c = aEx+bEy 
[nT/min) [V/km) [nT/min) [V/km) [A) 
0 9846 -4325 
1 9854 4 -0.009 -4332 -4 0.033 -4 
2 9856 1 0.024 -4337 -3 0.019 -8 
3 9865 4 -0.051 -4339 -1 0.033 5 
4 9877 6 -0.059 -4345 -3 0.034 6 
5 9892 7 -0.069 -4350 -3 0.032 8 
6 9880 -6 -0.013 -4342 4 -0.006 4 
7 9866 -7 0.024 -4339 2 -0.012 -3 
8 9854 -6 0.046 -4329 5 -0.030 -4 
9 9851 -2 0.030 -4325 2 -0.028 -1 
10 9852 1 0.025 -4317 4 -0.048 3 
11 9854 1 0.029 -4308 4 -0.052 3 
12 9842 -6 0.042 -4284 12 -0.101 8 
13 9842 0 0.004 -4258 13 -0.116 18 
14 9843 0 0.015 -4249 5 -0.089 12 
15 9852 5 -0.034 -4239 5 -0.085 20 
16 9866 7 -0.047 -4242 -1 -0.050 17 
17 9867 1 -0.018 -4243 -1 -0.024 8 
18 9872 3 -0.042 -4245 -1 -0.007 9 
19 9880 4 -0.044 -4245 0 -0.014 11 
20 9847 -16 0.074 -4226 10 -0.049 -7 
21 9843 -2 0.025 -4218 4 -0.031 0 
22 9852 4 -0.001 -4227 -5 0.004 -1 
23 9866 7 -0.034 -4271 -22 0.145 -17 
24 9901 18 -0.103 -4329 -29 0.206 -13 
25 9936 17 -0.137 -4384 -28 0.279 -18 
26 9956 10 -0.165 -4427 -21 0.280 -13 
27 9952 -2 -0.063 -4448 -11 0.235 -26 
28 9984 16 -0.167 -4453 -3 0.143 10 
29 10003 10 -0.139 -4442 6 0.035 22 
30 9971 -16 0.035 -4390 26 -0.117 12 
31 10065 47 -0.307 -4374 8 -0.080 74 
32 10041 -12 -0.033 -4373 1 -0.081 20 
33 9958 -41 0.209 -4354 9 -0.112 -23 
34 9931 -14 0.108 -4338 8 -0.115 -3 
35 9957 13 -0.027 -4343 -2 -0.025 10 
36 10081 62 -0.312 -4358 -8 0.000 62 
37 10001 -40 0.158 -4337 10 -0.080 -18 
38 9979 -11 0.031 -4278 30 -0.202 27 
39 9954 -12 0.075 -4202 38 -0.313 36 
40 9916 -19 0.152 -4176 13 -0.192 1 
41 9921 2 0.110 -4172 2 -0.163 5 
42 9897 -12 0.127 -4140 16 -0.213 9 











44 9789 -41 0.271 -4013 50 -0.372 7 
45 9777 -6 0.160 -4001 6 -0.156 -6 
46 9773 -2 0.166 -4039 -19 -0.008 -32 
47 9843 35 -0.163 -4108 -34 0.142 9 
48 9871 14 -0.067 -4126 -9 0.081 0 
49 9850 -11 -0.026 -4143 -8 0.150 -19 
50 9860 5 -0.078 -4119 12 0.050 7 
51 9824 -18 0.052 -4091 14 -0.036 -4 
52 9800 -12 0.106 -4091 0 -0.018 -18 
53 9784 -8 0.105 -4104 -6 0.016 -23 
54 9781 -2 0.073 -4123 -9 0.060 -24 
55 9751 -15 0.133 -4153 -15 0.096 -42 
56 9735 -8 0.111 -4169 -8 0.116 -41 
57 9733 -1 0.067 -4173 -2 0.086 -27 
58 9725 -4 0.057 -4192 -10 0.110 -29 
59 9720 -3 0.059 -4199 -3 0.067 -23 
60 9717 -1 0.035 -4201 -1 0.048 -15 
61 9707 -5 0.049 -4209 -4 0.049 -18 
62 9695 -6 0.065 -4219 -5 0.065 -24 
63 9683 -6 0.059 -4231 -6 0.064 -22 
64 9673 -5 0.061 -4249 -9 0.094 -27 
65 9678 3 0.022 -4270 -10 0.108 -22 
66 9671 -4 0.046 -4301 -15 0.155 -34 
67 9676 3 -0.005 -4334 -16 0.172 -27 
68 9702 13 -0.074 -4339 -3 0.108 -3 
69 9710 4 -0.048 -4327 6 0.038 3 
70 9699 -5 0.002 -4320 4 0.020 -4 
71 9683 -8 0.029 -4314 3 0.002 -6 
72 9691 4 -0.028 -4332 -9 0.041 -1 
73 9793 51 -0.301 -4356 -12 0.092 45 
74 9803 5 -0.097 -4362 -3 0.054 11 
75 9824 10 -0.181 -4368 -3 0.056 27 
76 9863 19 -0.239 -4371 -2 0.048 39 
77 9872 4 -0.131 -4344 13 -0.071 38 
78 9820 -26 0.063 -4317 14 -0.095 3 
79 9821 0 0.004 -4300 8 -0.092 14 
80 9829 4 -0.009 -4306 -3 -0.039 8 
81 9838 5 -0.008 -4313 -3 -0.035 7 
82 9854 8 -0.021 -4310 1 -0.036 10 
83 9859 3 -0.055 -4283 13 -0.082 24 
84 9872 6 -0.085 -4257 13 -0.097 33 
85 9875 2 -0.045 -4247 5 -0.085 23 
86 9850 -13 0.044 -4250 -2 -0.050 -1 
87 9841 -5 0.053 -4242 4 -0.063 0 
88 9828 -7 0.050 -4241 1 -0.029 -5 
89 9824 -2 0.059 -4247 -3 0.009 -13 
90 9821 -2 0.046 -4245 1 -0.007 -8 
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